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THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ... 1

Introductory paragraph.--The name of Sextus Empiricus. His profession.--The time when he lived.--The place of his birth.--The seat of the Sceptical School while Sextus was at its head.--The character of the writings of Sextus Empiricus.

THE POSITION AND AIM OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM ... 23

The subject-matter of the Hypotyposes.--The origin of Pyrrhonism.--The nomenclature of Pyrrhonism.--Its criterion.--Its aim.-- and .--The standpoint of Pyrrhonism.

THE SCEPTICAL TROPES ... 31

Origin of the name.--The ten Tropes of .--The First Trope.--The Second Trope.--The Third Trope.--The Fourth Trope.--The Fifth Trope.--The Sixth Trope.--The Seventh Trope.--The Eighth Trope.--The Ninth Trope.--The Tenth Trope.--The five Tropes of Agrippa.--The two Tropes.--The Tropes of Aenesidemus against Aetiology.

AENESIDEMUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS ... 63

Statement of the problem.--The theory of Pappenheim.--The theory of Brochard.--Zeller's theory.--The theory of Ritter and Saisset.--The theory of Hirzel and Natorp.--Critical examination of the subject.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PYRRHONISM ... 81

Pyrrhonism and Pyrrho.--Pyrrhonism and the Academy. Strength and weakness of Pyrrhonism.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PYRRHONIC SKETCHES BY SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK ... 101

Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiricus in recent times, especially, one may say, since the date of Herbart. There is much in the writings of Sextus that finds a parallel in the methods of modern philosophy. There is a common starting-point in the study of the power and limitations of human thought. There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena of sense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to the lower animals, and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge.

While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form a possible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical thought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical progress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing the truth in the subjects investigated.

Before beginning a critical study of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, and the light which they throw on the development of Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. We shall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from which he regarded philosophical questions.

The Sceptical School was long closely connected with the Empirical School of medicine, and the later Pyrrhoneans, when they were physicians, as was often the case, belonged for the most part to this school. Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first Sceptic, however, who is formally spoken of as an Empirical physician, and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also an Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and Theodas is difficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass agree that it was about 150 A.D. After the time of these two physicians, who were also each in turn at the head of the Sceptical School, there seems to have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to believe that this alliance existed until the time of Sextus.

The fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in regard to the date of Sextus is that Claudius Galen in his works mentions several Sceptics who were also physicians of the Empirical School, and often speaks of Herodotus, supposed to be identical with the teacher of Sextus given by Diogenes Laertius, but makes no reference whatever to Sextus. As Galen's time passes the limit of the second century A.D., we must either infer that Sextus was not the well-known physician that he was stated to be by Pseudo-Galen, and consequently not known to Galen, or that Galen wrote before Sextus became prominent as a Sceptic. This silence on the part of Galen in regard to Sextus increases the doubt, caused by Sextus' own criticism of the Empirical School of medicine, as to his having been an Empiricist. The question is made more complicated, as it is difficult to fix the identity of the Herodotus so often referred to by Galen. As Galen died about 200 A.D. at the age of seventy, we should fix the date of Sextus early in the third century, and that of Diogenes perhaps a little later than the middle, were it not that early in the third century the Stoics began to decline in influence, and could hardly have excited the warmth of animosity displayed by Sextus. We must then suppose that Sextus wrote at the very latter part of the second century, and either that Galen did not know him, or that Galen's books were published before Sextus became prominent either as a physician or as a Sceptic. The fact that he may have been better known as the latter than as the former does not sufficiently account for Galen's silence, as other Sceptics are mentioned by him of less importance than Sextus, and the latter, even if not as great a physician as Pseudo-Galen asserts, was certainly both a Sceptic and a physician, and must have belonged to one of the two medical schools so thoroughly discussed by Galen--either the Empirical or the Methodical. Therefore, if Sextus were a contemporary of Galen, he was so far removed from the circle of Galen's acquaintances as to have made no impression upon him, either as a Sceptic or a physician, a supposition that is very improbable. We must then fix the date of Sextus late in the second century, and conclude that the climax of his public career was reached after Galen had finished those of his writings which are still extant.

Pyrrho, the founder of the school, taught in Elis, his native village; but even as early as the time of Timon, his immediate follower, his teachings were somewhat known in Alexandria, where Timon for a while resided. The immediate disciples of Timon, as given by Diogenes, were not men known in Greece or mentioned in Greek writings. Then we have the well-known testimony of Aristocles the Peripatetic in regard to Aenesidemus, that he taught Pyrrhonism in Alexandria--.

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the general position and aim of Pyrrhonism.

After defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic, the Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that he does not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but that he intends simply to present the Sceptical arguments historically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes his treatment of the subject as general rather than critical, including a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its principles, its manner of reasoning, its criterion and aim, and a presentation of the Tropes, or aspects of doubt, and the Sceptical formulae and the distinction between Scepticism and the related schools of philosophy.

The result of all the gradual changes which the development of thought had brought about in the outward relations of the Sceptical School, was to increase the earnestness of the claim of the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the great founder of the movement. In discussing the names given to the Sceptics, Sextus gives precedence very decidedly to the title "Pyrrhonean," because Pyrrho appears the best representative of Scepticism, and more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it.

It was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancient times, whether Pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophical sect or not. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled , written shortly before our era, does not include Pyrrhonism among the other sects. Diogenes himself, after some hesitation remarking that many do not consider it a sect, finally decides to call it so.

Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an , or a movement, rather than a , saying that Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a systematic arrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has no dogmas. If, however, a sect may mean simply the following of a certain system of reasoning according to what appears to be true, then Scepticism is a sect. From a quotation given later on by Sextus from Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term . Sextus gives also the other titles, so well known as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, , , and . The of Scepticism is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every possible way to each other, and through the equal weight of things opposed, or , to reach first the state of suspension of judgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or "repose and tranquillity of soul." The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard to the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest talent began the Sceptical system by placing in opposition to every argument an equal one, thus leading to a philosophical system without a dogma, for the Sceptic claims that he has no dogma. The Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, but only to say what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or "All is false," include themselves with other things. The only statements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his own sensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry.

Sextus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by refuting it. The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions. "We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, meaning by this name the idea of it." Phenomena are the only things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life by them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus distinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena, and that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they constitute the appearances of objects. We see from this that Sextus makes the only reality to consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind. He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown outside, about which the Sceptic can make no assertions. Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they affect life in four different ways. They constitute the guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the arts important. According to the tradition of laws and customs, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itself an abstract good. The Sceptic of Sextus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case with professing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were. Sextus says, "We are not without energy in the arts which we undertake." This was a positive tendency which no philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy from his theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, and his life was governed by phenomena.

The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes. In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under other names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct. The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed. After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from the false during the time of , or suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow follows the body.

The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He is not wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and so on. He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the dogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they are by nature an evil. To the Sceptic nothing is in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that "he escapes from difficulties easier." For instance, he who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying "No more," is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good. For he who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good. The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor seek anything eagerly.

Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam on a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attempts to do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threw the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it produced a representation of the foam. Thus the Sceptics were never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly between the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came to them of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it.

It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to assert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and consequently to have the attitude of still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the teachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of the soul, or the ego, and denied absolute existence altogether. The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.

There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions which control the character of the phenomena.

Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and absolute reality can never be known.

At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of . The reason of this is evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes. To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.

Based upon the variety of animals.

Based upon the differences between men.

Based upon differences in the constitution of the sense organs.

Based upon circumstances.

Based upon position, distance and place.

Based upon mixtures.

Based upon the quantities and constitutions of objects.

Relation.

Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences.

Based upon systems, customs and laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.

Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his classification of them a regular gradation, from the arguments based upon differences in animals to those in man, first considering the latter in relation to the physical constitution, and then to circumstances outside of us, and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral differences.

After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a long chapter to prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to this in Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was a favourite line of argument with the Sceptics. Sextus, however, says that his course of reasoning is different from that of most of the Sceptics on the subject, as they usually applied their arguments to all animals, while he selected only one, namely the dog. This chapter is full of sarcastic attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion to the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which has been before referred to.

The dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken language, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is the fact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make. We have an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal," thus making a sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.

Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another example of the sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he refers to the as the authority for believing that the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general statement that they choose different professions; while Sextus elaborates this point, speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice and avoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men. The poets well understand this marked difference in human desires, as Homer says,

"One man enjoys this, another enjoys that."

Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,

"One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses, Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold, Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea."

Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual number of senses, would form altogether different ideas of the external world than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas of objects depend on our mental images, a greater number of sense organs would give us still different ideas of outward reality. The strong argument of the Stoics against such reasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony between nature and the soul, so that when a representation is produced in us of a real object, a , by this representation the soul grasps a real existence. There is a in us which is of the same kind, , or in relation to all nature. This argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we apprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his teachings. The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory of nature that included the soul and the external world in one harmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the third Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in his work against logic. He simply states here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, and furthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of the discord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion can be reached by those who are themselves an element of the uncertainty.

The same light or tone alters decidedly in different surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle at which the picture is suspended. With Diogenes this Trope is the seventh, and his exposition of it is similar, but as usual, shorter. Both Sextus and Diogenes give the illustration of the neck of the dove differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an illustration used by Protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the senses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light sunny and purple." Since, then, all phenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certain distance, and according to a certain position, each of which relations makes a great difference with the mental images, we shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving of the opinion.

See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus.

Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the older Sceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he attributes to the "later Sceptics." Sextus nowhere mentions the author of these Tropes. Diogenes, however, attributes them to Agrippa, a man of whom we know nothing except his mention of him. He was evidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a scholar of influence in the Sceptical School, who must have himself had disciples, as Diogenes says, add to these tropes other five tropes, using the plural verb. Another Sceptic, also mentioned by Diogenes, and a man unknown from other sources, named some of his books after Agrippa. Agrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of the Sceptical School, but his influence in the development of the thought of the School must have been great, as the transition from the ten Tropes of the "older Sceptics" to the five attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows the entrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in it. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written from an entirely different standpoint. The ten Tropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are rather rules of thought leading to logical proof, and are dialectic in their character. We find this distinction illustrated by the different way in which the Trope of relativity is treated in the two groups. In the first it points to an objective relativity, but with Agrippa to a general subjective logical principle. The originality of the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their substance matter, but in their formulation and use in the Sceptical School. These methods of proof were, of course, not new, but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by the Sceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon, while the goes back at least to Protagoras. The five Tropes are as follows.

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