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Read Ebook: Summa Theologica Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province by Thomas Aquinas Saint
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Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.
Obj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above . But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.
Obj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies . Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.
Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment of God.
Reply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness , but are in actual possession thereof.
Reply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
THIRD ARTICLE
Whether Hope Is in the Damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41: "Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.
Obj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Obj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written : "He believeth not that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before : "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says , "faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.
FOURTH ARTICLE
Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Obj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above . Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above . Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.
Obj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
QUESTION 19
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry:
Whether God is to be feared?
Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Whether servile fear is good?
Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Whether it grows when charity grows?
Whether it remains in heaven?
FIRST ARTICLE
Whether God Can Be Feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above . But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.
Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states , "we fear those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be feared.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.
Reply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.
SECOND ARTICLE
Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and Worldly Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness, shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above , and which are not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . . believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.
Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these other fears.
Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between them.
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