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Both France and England had large financial interests in Egypt, especially after the construction of the Suez Canal, which was opened for traffic in 1869.

But the affairs of Egypt were in a most unsatisfactory condition. The army was wholly unreliable, and extravagance in high places had brought the exchequer to the verge of bankruptcy. In 1882 matters reached a crisis. A revolution broke out, headed by Arabi Pasha, and the situation looked desperate. Joint naval and military action by Britain and France was proposed, but the French ships sailed away and left Britain with a free hand. The British fleet bombarded the Forts at Alexandria and a military force, based on the Suez Canal, was landed at Ismailia. This force completely defeated the army of Arabi Pasha at Tel-el-Kebir, put down the rebellion, and restored the government of the then Khedive, Tewfik Pasha. But the Khedivial government had been unable to cope with the rebellion single-handed; it had only been restored to power by British arms; it could not hope to retain that power unless continuously backed by the power of Britain.

From this time forward, whether she liked it or not, Britain found herself effectually saddled with the direction of the government of Egypt. In this position she became more fully confirmed by the Anglo-Egyptian military operations against the Soudan in 1885, under Gordon, and in 1898, under Kitchener. Outstanding differences with France were dispelled on the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, and Britain was left virtually mistress of Egypt.

Let us look for a minute at the military geography of Egypt, particularly with regard to the security of her frontiers from invasion. Egypt consists, or prior to the seventies consisted, of the Nile, its valley and delta, and the country rendered fertile by that river. On either side of this fertile belt is dry, barren desert. On the north is the Mediterranean Sea, and on the south the tropical Soudan. Thus, in the hands of a power that holds the command of the sea, Egypt is well adapted for defence. The tropical Soudan makes a well-nigh impossible line of advance for a large hostile force from the south, and the routes of approach from the east and from the west, across the waterless deserts, present obstacles scarcely less formidable. Since the seventies, however, another important factor has entered the problem, namely, the Suez Canal and the area of cultivation and civilization which has sprung up along its banks. The large amount of fresh water required for the maintenance of the Canal, for the use of the towns that have sprung up along its banks, and for the existence of the large population which the Canal has attracted, is brought by a Canal known as the Sweet Water Canal, from the river Nile. This Sweet Water Canal, and the piped services which it supplied, were, in 1914, wholly upon the western or Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. This western side was also well provided with communications. Trunk railways connected Ismailia, at the centre of the Canal, with Cairo and Alexandria, and lateral railways, running along the whole length of the Canal, connected it with Port Said and Suez.

Although, as was subsequently discovered, the problem of defending the Suez Canal was by no means the same as that of defending Egypt, the problems may, at first sight, appear identical. An enemy force moving from Palestine against the Suez Canal and Egypt, would have to cross a comparatively waterless desert for a distance of over a hundred miles. On coming into collision with the defenders of the Canal, such an enemy would be operating far from his base, with a long and vulnerable line of communications, and with little or no available fresh water. The defenders, operating along the line of the Suez Canal, would be close to their base, with admirable communications, both lateral and to the rear, and with the rich cultivated lands of Egypt on which to draw for supplies, whilst their supply of fresh water would be unlimited.

The boundary line between Egypt and Palestine in 1914 ran from Rafa, on the Mediterranean, to the head of the Gulf of Akaba, the north-eastern arm of the Red Sea. This line runs right across the desert and is distant about 120 miles from the Suez Canal. At first sight the boundary seems ideal, and in so far as the defence of Egypt alone was concerned, it left little or nothing to be desired. But, as subsequent events proved, this line was not good enough to safeguard the defences of the Canal.

On the outbreak of war, in August, 1914, between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Great Britain, France, Russia and Belgium on the other, the garrison of Egypt was augmented by troops sent out from England and India and from Australia. The Suez Canal, through which vast numbers of troops were passing, was of vital importance to the communications of the allies, and was strongly guarded accordingly. Two months later , Turkey threw in her hand with the Central Powers. One of the baits held out by Germany to induce the Turks to enter the struggle, was a promise that they should be restored to complete supremacy in Egypt. With the entering of Turkey into the war, and her open threats to invade Egypt, the protection of that country and of the Canal became a matter of extreme urgency.

The policy of defence adopted was that of making the line of the Canal the line of resistance. A large portion of the low-lying desert to the north-east of the Canal was flooded, so as to render approach by that direction impossible. Warships took up stations in the Canal itself, while naval patrol launches took over the duty of guarding the Bitter Lakes. The troops detailed for the defence of the Canal itself were entrenched upon the western side, with reserves concentrated at points of tactical importance. In this way full advantage was taken of the lateral communications on the western side of the Canal, while it was thought that the difficulties of crossing the desert on the eastern side would make approach by the Turks well-nigh impossible.

Meanwhile, the Turk was not letting the grass grow under his feet. Whether the Germans ever intended to pay the price for Turkish adhesion by sending a strong enough force to make the invasion of Egypt practicable is open to doubt. The Turkish rank and file were certainly led to believe that a serious invasion of Egypt was intended. But it is much more likely that the object of the Germans was to detain as large a British force as possible in Egypt and thus prevent their taking part in the fighting in France. A secondary object may have been to render the Suez Canal temporarily impassable. Whatever may have been the chestnuts that Germany hoped to get out of the fire, it was clear that Turkey was willing to act as catspaw, and attempt a foolhardy invasion of Egypt. Consequently, the construction of a new military railway in Syria was put in hand, and by January, 1915, the Turks had formed advanced posts at Auja, on the frontier, and also at Kosseima, El Arish, and Khan Epenus in the desert. The problem of water supply has always presented a difficulty to armies crossing this waterless desert. There are a certain number of reservoirs and cisterns which hold up water during the rains. In the winter time these would be full. The Turk is less particular about the water which he drinks than the white man, and doubtless he could, to some extent, be supplied from some of the brackish pools in the desert, with water that no one would think of offering to a British soldier.

The light pontoons that the Turks dragged across the desert for crossing the Canal are said to have been used for carrying water during certain stages of the advance. Suffice it to say that the Turks did succeed in solving the water problem, and in crossing the desert with a force of some considerable strength.

On the 3rd February, 1915, the threatened attack materialized. Before dawn, some of the light pontoons which the Turks had brought with them, were launched on the Canal. These were manned, while other Turks deployed along the eastern bank and opened fire to cover the crossing. The troops defending this portion of the Canal, mostly Indians, opened fire upon the pontoons, with the result that many of them were sunk. Two of the pontoons, however, reached the western bank, and their crews, numbering about twenty, surrendered. There was fighting throughout the day, but no further crossing of the Canal. On the next day the east bank was swept, with the result that a considerable party of the enemy were captured. After this, the Turks withdrew, and marched back to Palestine. This was the only time that a formed body of the enemy succeeded in reaching the Canal. But they had shown that it was possible for them to achieve the almost impossible, and thus they gave the authorities responsible for the defence of Egypt much food for thought.

The menace to Egypt was for a time delayed, though not wholly removed, by the expedition against the Dardanelles.

To co-operate with our Russian allies, the British Government decided, early in 1915, to attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The strategic gains promised were highly attractive, and included--the passage of arms and munitions from the allies to Russia in exchange for wheat, the neutrality and possible adherence of the outstanding Balkan States, the severing of communications between European and Asiatic Turkey, the drawing off of Turkish troops from the theatres of the war, and the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and ultimately from Europe. Incidentally, it was considered, on the principle that the best defensive is an offensive, that a thrust at the very heart of Turkey, a threat against Constantinople itself, would afford the best means of defending Egypt.

The story of the Dardanelles expedition has been often told, and scarcely forms a part of this history, so a few words must suffice. In February, 1915, we started by bombarding the forts with a few old warships. The forts at the outer entrance were soon silenced, and early in March, the warships moved up to the Narrows. On the 18th, a great effort was made to reduce the forts about the Narrows; but it failed, with the loss of three battleships and more than 2,000 men. This demonstrated the fact that the Dardanelles could never be opened by sea power alone, and, accordingly, amphibious operations became necessary. An expeditionary force was assembled in Egypt, and Mudros was selected as the advanced base. On April 25, landings were effected on the extreme point of the Gallipoli Peninsula. In spite of heroic attempts, we did little more than effect a precarious lodgment. Further operations were necessary; additional divisions were brought out from home; and on the night of the 6th/7th August, another landing was effected at Suvla Bay. But the new plan was no more successful than the old. Within a couple of days this force also had settled down to a war of positions. Winter was approaching; our positions on the peninsula would then become no longer tenable. No progress could be made, and at length it was decided to evacuate. The Suvla Bay force was withdrawn first; and the evacuation of the main body of troops was completed on the 20th December. The withdrawal was carried out with the same brilliance that had characterized the various landings, and with so small a number of casualties that it was described as "an achievement without parallel in the annals of war."

Many of the regiments that fought against the Turks at Gallipoli were withdrawn, directly or indirectly to Egypt, and subsequently met the Turk again during the advance into Palestine. Included among these were the 10th, 52nd, 53rd and 54th Divisions, besides regiments of Anzacs and Yeomanry. In so far as the Dardanelles operations aimed at protecting Egypt, they were a success; for, while they were in progress, no organized invasion of Egypt was attempted. But the evacuation had the effect of liberating a large force of Turkey's best troops for operations against Mesopotamia and Egypt.

It would be convenient to pause here and take stock of the military situation in Egypt, in the light of over a year's experience of actual war.

In the first place, the Turks had disillusioned us as to the impossibility of crossing the waterless desert, and had actually crossed it with a considerable armed and organized force. They announced that what they had effected had been nothing more than a reconnaissance. In any case, they had shown us what they could do, and that, backed by the resources of the Central Powers, there would be no insuperable obstacle to their bringing a large and fully equipped army across the desert.

In the second place, we had discovered that the problems of defending the Suez Canal and of defending Egypt were not identical. While the Canal formed an admirable moat, an obstacle difficult to negotiate when stoutly defended, and so a capital defensive line for the protection of the Nile; yet this line was inadequate for the protection of the Canal itself or for securing the immunity of the passing shipping.

And so, thirdly, we realized that some other line must be found for the protection of the Canal. While we were sitting on the west bank, small parties of Turks approached the eastern bank. On more than one occasion, in the summer of 1915, they succeeded in placing mines in the fairway of the Canal. It would, therefore, have been quite possible for them to have seriously interfered with the working of the Canal and the passage of shipping. Granted that a new line must be found, the question arises where such new line should be drawn. A line across the actual desert may be all very well in war time, though none too easy to hold, for the reasons that we have already discussed. But to keep a garrison on such a line for ever would be well-nigh intolerable. Thus, by a process of elimination, we find that the most suitable line for the permanent defence of the Suez Canal is the fertile country beyond the eastern desert--in other words, Palestine.

Fourthly, it had been brought home to us that the worst form of defence is a passive defence. As, therefore, the Turk would not leave well alone, but insisted on attacking us in Egypt, so it became necessary for us to meet him on his own ground, to push a vigorous offensive, and eventually to carry the war into Palestine.

THE DESERT OF SINAI

In accordance with the policy of defending the Suez Canal upon a line further east, the construction of a new defensive line was put in hand during the early months of 1916. No longer were the Turks to be allowed to annoy us by actually reaching the Canal. A line of trenches, protected by barbed wire entanglements, was constructed out in the desert, a few miles to the east of the Canal. As may be imagined, this was no easy task. A large amount of excavation was necessary for a small amount of trench; walls had to be built up with sandbags; and other steps had to be taken to prevent the sides from foundering, and to construct a work that would withstand shell fire.

Meanwhile, other preparations were put in hand for carrying the defensive line further to the east. The construction was commenced of a broad gauge of railway from Kantara eastwards across the desert. This railway eventually became the trunk line between Egypt and Palestine. In the days of trench warfare before Gaza, it transported freight trains heavily laden with rations and ammunitions, troop trains conveying officers and men in open trucks, hospital trains evacuating sick and wounded, and an all-sleeping-car express running nightly in each direction. In 1918, a swing-bridge was improvised across the Suez Canal, and Jerusalem and Cairo were then connected by rail without change of carriage being necessary. The future prospects of this railway seem unbounded. It will undoubtedly be continued through to Damascus and Aleppo, where it will connect with railways to Constantinople and to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. Thus it will form part of a grand trunk railway system along the old caravan routes connecting the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. In its conception, it was just a military railway, laid, with but little preparation, across the sands of the desert. To this railway, however, was largely due the success of the campaign that we are about to consider.

We have already seen that the Sinaitic Desert is almost waterless. Although it has often been crossed by invading armies in both directions, the provision of water has always presented the greatest difficulty. The carriage of water in tanks upon the backs of camels, a method used by us for locally supplying troops between water dumps and the headquarters of units, proved successful here thousands of years ago. The plan adopted by the Turks of dragging water-holding pontoons across the desert was not to be despised. Further progress was made when supplies of water were transported in tank-trucks along the railway. But a bolder adaptation of modern science to desert fighting was reached, when it was decided to lay on a piped supply of water from the Nile.

We have seen that the western bank of the Suez Canal was already provided with a plentiful supply of fresh water by the Sweet Water Canal. Plant was now installed for making this water available for the troops. Purity had to be considered as well as adequacy of supply. A peculiar danger had to be guarded against. There is a disease prevalent in Egypt, of a particularly unpleasant character and persistent type, called by the medical profession Bilhaziosis, but better known to our men as "Bill Harris." This disease is conveyed by a parasitic worm found in the waters of the Nile, and affects not only those who drink the water, but also those who bathe in it or merely wash. Consequently, orders were stringent against even touching Nile water which had not previously been treated. This necessitated the troops east of the Canal being put upon a very restricted supply, and they were accordingly rationed at the rate of a gallon of water per head per day for all purposes, including washing, cooking and drinking. At the Kantara waterworks water was drawn in from the Sweet Water Canal, mixed with alum, and pumped through settling tanks into filters. When it had passed through these, it was pumped underneath the Suez Canal into reservoirs on the eastern bank. Here it was chlorinated; and hence the water, now fit for all purposes, was pumped forward to its destination. There being no gradient to assist the natural flow of the water, it had to be pumped forward by successive stages. The first stage was as far as Romani; when working at greatest length the pumping stages numbered no less than seventeen. At times, during the advance, the railway had to be called in aid; and train-loads of water for the use of advanced troops were railed from pipe-head up to rail-head. At some stages of the advance this supply could be supplemented by local water, which, though generally somewhat brackish, was employed for the horses, mules and camels. It was even found to have no ill-effect upon the troops, if used for a limited period, and if necessary precautions were taken. At other stages, where water was non-existent, or rendered wholly unapproachable by enemy dispositions, our force became entirely dependent upon the supply delivered through the pipe-line. Ultimately, when we settled down to protracted trench warfare before Gaza, this pipe-line was delivering a constant supply of water into our trenches, distant some couple of hundred miles from the banks of the Nile.

Kantara started upon a process of development worthy of the base of such an expedition. Before the war, it had been little more than a small Canal village, comprising a few huts. It eventually grew into an important railway terminus with wharves and cranes, a railway ferry and 40 miles of sidings. Miles of first-class macadamized roads were made, vast ordnance and supply dumps arose, and camps and depots were established for man and beast. The scale on which this mushroom town developed was stupendous.

Early in 1916, the Turks, relieved from imminent danger near home by our evacuation of Gallipoli, came down again in force through Syria, Palestine and the Desert, to attack us in Egypt. Our construction gangs, engaged upon the new railway and upon the development of local water supplies, were at this time covered by escorts, mainly of cavalry, spread out upon a wide front. On the 23rd of April several thousand Turks, operating in three columns, attacked our desert posts at Oghratina, Katia and Dueidar respectively, the two former being about 30 miles and the last named about 10 miles to the east of Kantara. Oghratina and Katia, being well out in the desert, were cavalry posts held by yeomanry. These two posts were rushed by a large force of the enemy under cover of fog, and, though a stubborn resistance was offered, and the fighting was severe, the posts were overwhelmed. At Dueidar, an infantry post, some 20 miles or so nearer our base, the Turk was less successful. Under cover of the same fog, about 900 Turks tried to rush this post at dawn. They found the garrison standing to, and were beaten off. Though they made three distinct attempts to break through, they were unsuccessful. The garrison was reinforced and the Turks were repulsed.

Mutta Rob ei liikahtanut.

"Kuulkaa, hyv?t yst?v?t", h?n sanoi, "en saa rauhaa kun ajattelen, ett? kaksi miesraukkaa viel? on heid?n kynsiss??n. Heid?n kohtalonsa on jokseenkin varma, jos heid?t vied??n Nottinghamiin."

"Yht? varma kuin se, ett? hirsipuu ja nuora viev?t hengen", huudahti puunhakkaaja Will, "sill? he ovat noita mets?n salaisimmissa sopukoissa kuljeksivia henkipattoja. Heid?n ja mets?nvartijoiden v?lill? on katkera sota, ja ylpe?ksi tulee julma sheriffikin saadessaan pari heist? kynsiins?."

"Niin kyll?", sanoi vanha mies, "he ovat miesraukkoja, jotka normannien hirmuvalta ja ankarat mets?lait ovat karkottaneet kodeistaan. Nyt he piileksiv?t metsiss? ja el?v?t mets?nriistasta ja ovat mennytt? miest?, jos joutuvat lain kouriin."

"Opasta minut sille polulle, jota heid?n on kuljettava Nottinghamiin", huusi Robin.

"Se k?y helposti", vastasi vanha puunhakkaaja. "Poikanikin osaisi sinua opastaa. Mutta mit? hy?ty? siit? olisi? Mit? voi yksi mies kokonaista kuninkaan mets?nvartijajoukkuetta vastaan?"

"En viel? tied?, mit? teen", huusi Rob, "mutta siet?m?tt?m?lt? tuntuu, ett? noita miesraukkoja raahataan aivan kuin minua, ja ilomielin uskallan yritt?? iske? heid?n puolestaan, jos tilaisuutta ilmaantuu."

"Hyvin puhuttu, toveri", huusi Will, "ja min? rupean oppaaksi. L?hde sin?, is?, mets??n ja laittaudu turvaan. Tapaamme taas ison tammen luona."

T?m?n j?lkeen pieni seurue hajaantui. Robin l?hti Willin opastamana uutta polkua takaisin suon yli, ja vanha puunhakkaaja suuntasi kulkunsa Sherwoodin saloille.

Kahdenkymmenen minuutin kuluttua Rob ja Will l?hestyiv?t puiden suojassa pient? kyl??, mutta vastakkaiselta puolelta kuin mist? olivat paenneet. Tirkist?ess??n er??st? tihe?st? pensaikosta he parhaiksi n?kiv?t, miten mets?nvartijat marssivat kyl?st? pois, vangit keskell??n. Pakolaisten takaa-ajo oli keskeytetty vaarallisen r?meen reunassa, ja joukkue palasi nyt Nottinghamiin. Reen he j?ttiv?t paikoilleen, ja sen l?hell? virui Hobb raukka samassa asennossa mihin oli kaatunutkin.

"Pelastamaan ja kostamaan", mutisi Robin Hood, ja Will ny?kk?si ja kertasi sanat ihmeiss??n, aivan kuin ei olisi voinut aavistaakaan, mill? tavoin se k?visi p?ins?.

"No, Will", sanoi Rob, "kerro tarkkaan, mit? tiet? noiden mahtavien mets?nvartijoiden on kuljettava kaupunkiin."

Will innostui kuvailemaan, ja pian Robin kohotti k?tens?. "Hyv? on", h?n sanoi, "t?ss? voi viel? k?yd? hyvinkin. Suuri, avoin kentt?, sanot. Opasta minut sinne, Will, ja koetetaan joutua perille ennen kuin mets?nvartijat ovat kulkeneet sen poikki."

Will Stutely, se nimitt?in oli puunhakkaajan nimi, kulki edell?, ja he kiiruhtivat mets?n l?pi ja saapuivat avoimelle kent?lle juuri kun mets?nvartijat olivat sen keskell?. Robin Hood j?tti Willin puiden suojaan, astui ylpe?sti n?kyviin ja huusi kovalla ??nell? p??mets?nvartijalle.

"Hoi, mets?nvartija!" h?n huusi, "luovuttakaa vangit, tai teid?n k?y huonosti."

P??mets?nvartija saattoi tuskin uskoa omia silmi??n n?hdess??n, ett? Rob oli tullut, kuten n?ytti, yksin??n takaisin vastustamaan vihollistensa suurta joukkoa. Mutta h?n oli liian vihoissaan kyet?kseen vastaamaan; h?n tarttui vain kiireesti jouseensa ampuakseen ylpe?n nuorukaisen, ennen kuin t?m? ehtisi palata puiden suojaan. H?n j?nnitti jousensa kaikin voimin ja liipaisi nuolen. Mutta v?limatka oli liian pitk?, ja nuoli tupsahti ruohoturpeeseen kahdenkymmenen yardin p??h?n Robin Hoodista.

Nyt Robin n?ytti heille ison jousensa voimaa ja silmiens? ihmetelt?v?? tarkkuutta, sill? h?n pani yardin pituisen nuolen j?nteeseen ja ampui hetke?k??n t?ht??m?tt?. Samassa p??mets?nvartija parahti kovasti ja kaatui maahan, kiskoen vimmatusti nuolta, joka oli puhkaissut h?nen kurkkunsa ja tunkeutunut viel? pitk?lt? niskastakin ulos.

Mets?nvartijoiden seisoessa t?t? hirvitt?v?? laukausta ihmettelem?ss? kaikui Robinin ??ni taas: "Laskekaa vangit irti, muutoin teid?t perii hukka!"

Hetken odotettuaan h?n ampui uuden nuolen, joka puhkaisi toisen, l?hint? vankia pitelev?n miehen hartiat. Ja tuskin t?m? nuoli oli iskenyt, kun viel? yksi tulla suhahti heid?n joukkoonsa surmaten vangin toisella puolella olevan miehen. Mets?nvartijat huomasivat, ettei kukaan vankien l?heisyydess? oleva voinut s?ily? hengiss?.

Nuoren jousimiehen taituruus oli saanut ne kaksi miest?, jotka vartioivat toista vankia, sellaisen pelon valtaan, ett? he juoksivat tiehens?, jotta ei nelj?s nuoli sattuisi jompaankumpaan heist?. Heid?n pakonsa sai pari kolme mets?nvartijaa liikkeelle, ja pakokauhu valtasi koko joukon. He livistiv?t tiehens? yli kent?n, sill? he pelk?siv?t olla t?m?n verrattoman jousimiehen n?kyviss?, t?m?n nuolet kun kaatoivat heit? maahan, yhdenk??n heist? kykenem?tt? nuolellaan saavuttamaan Robinia.

"He pakenevat! He pakenevat!" huudahti puunhakkaaja Will ihastuneena juosten esiin pensaan takaa, josta oli seurannut tapahtumien kulkua. "Mutta totta toisen kerran, Robin Hood, sin?h?n osaat j?nnitt?? mainiosti pitk?njousen. Nyt menen auttamaan vankeja."

Will juoksi kiireimm?n kaupalla miesten luo ja katkaisi heid?n siteens? leve?ll? puukollaan.

Molemmat miehet olivat pelkk?? iloa ja kiitollisuutta. He kiitteliv?t ja siunasivat Robin Hoodia kiitt?m?st? p??sty??n, sill? he tiesiv?t varsin hyvin, ett? Nottinghamiin saavuttua heid?t olisi tuota pikaa hirtetty.

"Ihme ja kumma, etteiv?t mets?nvartijat surmanneet teit? heti kiinni jouduttuanne", sanoi Will Stutely, "kun n?kiv?t teid?n olevan 'sudenp?it?' ja joka miehen tapettavia."

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