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A NARRATIVE OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH HIS MORTAL WOUNDING AT ANTIETAM, Sharpsburg, Maryland, September 17, 1862.

BY JOHN MEAD GOULD, LATE ACTING ADJUTANT 10TH MAINE VOLUNTEERS, AND MAJOR 29TH MAINE VETERAN VOLS.

PORTLAND: STEPHEN BERRY, PRINTER. 1895.

Joseph King Fenno Mansfield was born in New Haven, Conn., December 22, 1803. His early education was obtained in the common schools of his state. At the age of fourteen he entered the military academy at West Point, being the youngest of a class of forty. During the five years of his course, he was a careful and earnest student, especially distinguishing himself in the sciences, and graduating in 1822, second in his class.

He was immediately promoted to the Corps of Engineers, in which department he served throughout the Mexican war. In 1832 he was made 1st Lieutenant; three years later Captain.

His gallantry and efficiency during the Mexican war were rewarded by successive brevets of Major, Lt.-Colonel and Colonel of Engineers.

In 1853 Mansfield was appointed Inspector General of the army, and in the prosecution of his duties visited all parts of the country.

At the outbreak of the War of the Rebellion he was in the Northwest, but in April, 1861, was summoned to Washington to take command of the forces there. On May 17, 1861, Mansfield was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in the regular army.

He rendered valuable service at Fortress Monroe, Newport News, Suffolk, and finally at Antietam, where he was mortally wounded, September 17, 1862.

NARRATIVE.

It was bad enough and sad enough that Gen. Mansfield should be mortally wounded once, but to be wounded six, seven or eight times in as many localities is too much of a story to let stand unchallenged.

These pages will tell what the members of the 10th Maine Regiment know of the event, but first we will state what others have claimed.

The following places have been pointed out as the spot where Mansfield was wounded and all sorts of particulars have been given. Besides these a man with a magic-lantern is traveling through the country showing Burnside's bridge, and remarking, "Here Mansfield fell."

Col. Keatley's letters show that he has been on the field several times since the war, which makes it harder to believe what would seem very plain otherwise, that his memory of locations has failed him. He appears to have got the recollection of the two woods mixed. Keatley was Sergeant of Co. A, the extreme left of the 125th Penn.

There are several other places that have been described to me in private letters, but these need no mention here.

WHY SO MANY ERRORS?

Why has there been so much difficulty in identifying the right locality?

There has been no difficulty, none whatever, among those who knew the facts. The errors have all come from the ignorant, the imaginative, and those who have poor memories.

It will be easy, especially for one standing on the ground while reading these pages, to see that very few except the 10th Maine would witness the event, as we were so nearly isolated and almost hidden. We made very little account at the time, of what is now considered an important event in the history of the battle. It then appeared to us as only one of the many tragedies in the great slaughter. Nothing was done at the time to mark the spot, and hardly a note of the event was recorded.

REGIMENTAL EXCURSION.

In 1889, the 1-10-29th Maine Regiment Association made an excursion to the various battle fields in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia where the regiment had fought. Friday, October 4th, was the day of the visit to Antietam. Not one of the company had been there for twenty-five years, yet on arriving in East Woods we readily and surely identified the fighting position of the regiment, which was known as the "Tenth Maine," at the time of the battle. We found that the west face of the woods had been considerably cut away, and that many of the trees inside the woods had been felled, but there was no serious change in the neighborhood where we fought, excepting that a road had been laid out exactly along the line of battle where we fired our first volley. We have since learned that in 1872, the County bought a fifteen feet strip of land, 961 feet long, bordering that part of the northeast edge of the woods, which lies between Samuel Poffenberger's lane and the Smoketown road, and moved the "worm fence" fifteen feet into the field. Excepting as these changes affected the view, all agreed that everything in our vicinity had a "natural look." The chief features were "the bushes," directly in rear of our right companies; the Croasdale Knoll, further to the right and rear; the Smoketown Road, which enters East Woods between the bushes and the Knoll, and runs past our front through the woods; the low land in our right front; the "open," easily discernable through the woods; the rising land with its ledges, big and little, in the front; the denser woods in the left front; the worm fence before noted, and the long ledge behind it, against which our left companies sheltered themselves by Captain Jordan's thoughtful guidance; and the gully beginning in the rear of our position and leading down to the great stone barn and stone mansion, with its immense spring of water.

The large oak in rear of our right, to which Col. Beal crawled after he was wounded, was still standing a few paces up the Smoketown road, and another good sized tree nearer the front was recognized by Capt. Goss as the one from which he first opened fire. Lt.-Col. Emerson stood where he stood in 1862 and pointed out to our guests place after place which he recognized.

Many of "the bushes" of 1862 had grown into sizable trees; they, with Beal's and Goss's trees and the Smoketown road fence, had been a serious obstacle to the advance of our right companies.

The scar, or depression in the ground, where we had buried a few of our dead , was still visible, but repeated plowing since 1889 has entirely effaced it.

It is necessary now to go back to 1862 and tell the story of the battle as seen by the 10th Maine; and as since the war a generation has grown up that knows nothing of the way soldiers are arranged for marching and fighting, it is best to give a great many explanations that may seem unnecessary to an old soldier.

THE PART TAKEN BY THE 10TH MAINE.

The 12th Army Corps, Mansfield commanding, marched on the Boonsboro pike, late at night of Sept. 16th, from "the center" through Keedysville to the farm of George Line and there rested till daybreak. Gen. Mansfield slept on the west side of a fence which ran south from Line's garden to woods. His bed was the grass and his roof a blanket. The 10th Maine was on the east side of the fence , and some of our boys who indulged in loud talk were ordered by the General to lower their tones to a whisper. The other regiments of our brigade were near us, while the other brigades of the corps appeared to be behind ours . Our brigade was the advance of the corps, and marched a little before 5 o'clock on the morning of the battle, first to the west across the Smoketown road, and nearly to John Poffenberger's, and then south to nearly abreast of Joseph Poffenberger's , and there halted for almost an hour, during all of which time, that is from before 5 A. M., Hooker's corps was fighting in and around "the great cornfield," the enemy being south and west of it.

As well as could be judged, all of the 12th corps followed our movements, and halted to the right or left of the rear of our brigade.

The 124th and 125th Penn. were detached from the brigade at some early hour, but at 7.20 by my watch, which may have been five to ten minutes fast, the other four regiments were started for the fight.

The 10th Maine was guided by Gen. Mansfield in person. We had all seen him for some time previous sitting on his horse at the northwest corner of the East Wood, marked W on the map. He hurried us, first to the front, down hill through a field where several piles of stone lay, the Smoketown road still being on our left. We barely entered the "ten acre cornfield" when Mansfield beckoned us to move to our left. We then marched a few steps by what the tactics call "Left oblique," but did not gain ground to the left sufficiently to suit the General, so Col. Beal commanded "Left flank," whereupon each man faced east, and we presently knocked over the two fences of the Smoketown road and marched into Sam Poffenberger's field. While going across the Smoketown road Gen. Hooker rode from the woods and told Col. Beal "The enemy are breaking through my lines; you must hold these woods,"

After crossing the road, bullets from the enemy began to whiz over and around us. When well into Sam Poffenberger's field the Colonel commanded "Right flank," then each man again faced south and we all marched straight for the enemy, whom some of us could see in the woods, close to where our Mansfield marker is now standing, marked M on the map.

The 10th Maine was in "double column at half distance"

Each line in the diagram represents about 15 men all facing "front." In this order we had bivouacked and marched to Sam Poffenberger's field, only that while in the ten acre corn field every man turned on his left heel and marched toward what had been the "left," until arriving in Sam Poffenberger's field, where a turn of each man to his right, or the technical "front," brought us to our original position.

Apparently fifty to a hundred Confederates were strung along the fence firing at us. They had the immense advantage that they could rest their rifles on the fence and fire into us, massed ten ranks deep, while we could only march and "take it."

It was high time to deploy, and Col. Beal proposed to do so, but Gen. Mansfield said "No," and remarked that a regiment can be easier handled "in mass" than "in line"; which is very true in the abstract. Gen. Mansfield then rode away, and Col. Beal, hardly waiting for him to get out of sight, ordered the regiment to deploy in double quick time. Everybody felt the need of haste.

In the execution of this order Companies I and G, with the color guard, continued marching straight ahead at the ordinary step, just as if no order had been given. The men of Co's F, C, D and B turned to their left and ran east--toward Sam Poffenberger's Co's H, A, K and E turned to the right and ran west--toward the Smoketown road. As fast as the respective companies "uncovered," they came to "Front" and advanced to the front, still running. In other words, after Co. B had run east and Co. E west, the length of their company, each man turned to the front and the company ran till B was left of G, and E was right of I, which being done B and E quit running and took up the ordinary step. It will be seen that D had twice as far to run to the east, and K twice as far to the west, and that C and A ran three times, and F and H four times as far as B and E had done.

I have been so circumstantial in describing all this for two reasons. First, because standing to-day on the battle line of the 10th Maine , and looking over the fence northeast into Sam Poffenberger's field, as the Confederates did, one will see how it was that when the 10th Me., with about 300 men, came to deploy and to advance afterward, the Smoketown fence, and the trees of Beal and Goss, with "the bushes," were an obstacle to the right companies, and the ledge would have been somewhat so to the left companies if Capt. Jordan had not halted his division behind it. He did this for shelter as the first reason, and because, perceiving there was no Union force on our left, he knew it was better to have our left "refused" and hence not so easily "flanked" by the enemy.

Second, and more particularly, I wish to state that on Nov. 9, 1894, Major Wm. N. Robbins, 4th Alabama, Law's brigade, Hood's division of the Confederate army, met me by appointment on the field and compared experiences. We had previously had a long correspondence, in which he persistently referred to seeing a "hesitating" Union regiment which he ordered his troops to fire into. The result of this fire was the dispersion of the Union regiment, whereupon he himself went over towards his left and attended to affairs nearer the great cornfield. After a great deal of correspondence with every Union and Confederate regiment that fought in the vicinity, I could not learn of any Union regiment that was dispersed, either in Sam Poffenberger's field, or in the "field of stone piles," nor could the Major determine, by consulting the map alone, whether it was the Smoketown road or Joe Poffenberger's bypath that was on his left when the Union regiment dispersed.

In November, '94, when we met on the ground, he was sure that the Smoketown road was on his left. Hence it was plain that it could be only the 10th Maine that "dispersed."

Yet we certainly did not!!

For a little while it was a very dark problem; then it dawned upon me that from where the Major stood he did not see the movement of our center and right as we deployed, while the running to the east of Co's F, C, D and G appeared to him precisely like a dispersion. I do not know a better illustration of how difficult it is to see things in battle as they really are happening.

With this vexed question settled, it becomes easier to understand the movements of other regiments, but these do not concern us now, further than that there was no other regiment at the time and place for Maj. Robbins to "disperse."

The result of this extensive correspondence assures me that Gen. Mansfield was wounded by Maj. Robbins' command, to which I will refer presently.

The reader will readily see how easily we can remember these prominent features of the field, and how surely we can identify our old position after the lapse of years. We are not confronted with the difficult task which those have who fought in the open field with no striking landmarks near; and where the position of the fences have been changed.

To resume the narrative: The enemy fell back as we approached. On arriving at the fence, we opened fire, and then rushed into the woods for such cover as the trees, &c., offered. The enemy also was well scattered through the woods, behind numerous ledges, logs, trees and piles of cord wood, a few men only being east of the Smoketown road, which at that time was not fenced.

The fire of the enemy was exceedingly well aimed; and as the distance between us was only about one hundred yards we had a bloody time of it.

We had fired only a few rounds, before some of us noticed Gens. Mansfield and Crawford, and other mounted officers, over on the Croasdale Knoll, which, with the intervening ground, was open woods. Mansfield at once came galloping down the hill and passed through the scattered men of the right companies, shouting "Cease firing, you are firing into our own men!" He rode very rapidly and fearlessly till he reached the place where our line bent to the rear . Captain Jordan now ran forward as far as the fence, along the top of the ledge behind which his division was sheltered, and insisted that Gen. Mansfield should "Look and see." He and Sergt. Burnham pointed out particular men of the enemy, who were not 50 yards away, that were then aiming their rifles at us and at him. Doubtless the General was wounded while talking with Jordan; at all events he was convinced, and remarked, "Yes, you are right." He then turned his horse and passed along to the lower land where the fence was down, and attempted to go through, but the horse, which also appeared to be wounded, refused to step into the trap-like mass of rails and rubbish, or to jump over. The General thereupon promptly dismounted and led the horse into Sam Poffenberger's field. I had noticed the General when he was with Crawford on the Croasdale Knoll, and had followed him with my eye in all his ride. Col. Beal was having a great deal of trouble with his horse, which was wounded and appeared to be trying to throw the Colonel, and I was slow in starting from the Colonel to see what Mansfield's gestures meant. I met him at the gap in the fence. As he dismounted his coat blew open, and I saw that blood was streaming down the right side of his vest.

The General was very quick in all his motions and attempted to mount as soon as the horse had got through the fence; but his strength was evidently failing, and he yielded to the suggestion that we should take him to a surgeon. What became of the orderly and the horse none of us noticed. Sergt. Joe Merrill, of Co. F, helped carry the General off; a young black man, who had just come up the ravine from the direction of Sam Poffenberger's, was pressed into service. He was very unwilling to come with us, as he was hunting for Capt. Somebody's frying-pan, the loss of which disturbed him more than the National calamity. Joe Merrill was so incensed at the Contraband's sauciness, his indifference to the danger, and his slovenly way of handling the General, that he begged me to put down the General and "fix things." It turned out that Joe's intention was to "fix" the darkey, whom he cuffed and kicked most unmercifully. We then got a blanket and other men, and I started off ahead of the re-formed squad to find a Surgeon.

The road had appeared to be full of ambulances a half hour before, but all were gone now and we carried the General clear to Sam Poffenberger's woods. Here I saw Gen. Geo. H. Gordon, commanding the 3d brigade of our division, told him the story and asked him to send an orderly or aide for a surgeon, but he said he could not as he had neither with him. He was moving the 107th N. Y., a new, large regiment; an ambulance was found and two medical officers, just inside the woods, a few steps north of where Sam Poffenberger's gate now hangs, marked K on the map. The younger doctor put a flask to the General's mouth. The whiskey, or whatever it was, choked the General and added greatly to his distress. We put the General into the ambulance and that was the last I saw of him. Lieut. Edw. R. Witman, 46th Penn., an aide to Gen. Crawford, had been sent back by Gen. Crawford, who evidently saw Mansfield in his fatal ride. I turned over ambulance and all to him and returned to the regiment; but when I arrived I found that Tyndale's and Stainrook's brigades of Greene's division had swept the woods a little while after I had gone, carrying a dozen or two of the 10th with them, and that Gen. Gordon had followed later with the 107th New York. Only twenty or thirty men of the 10th Maine were left on the ground; the colors and the others had gone out and taken position somewhere back of the Croasdale Knoll.

We buried some of the dead of our regiment in the north edge of "the bushes," near to the Smoketown road fence. During the remainder of the day a very large number of the officers and men of the regiment were detailed by various medical officers to bring off wounded men from "the cornfield" and woods, for the ambulance department was not organized at that time as it was later in the war, and was not equal to the task.

We also buried the Confederate dead that fell in our immediate front, but somehow the cracker-box head boards were marked , and this little error made trouble enough for me as Historian of the regimental association.

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