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Ebook has 698 lines and 77565 words, and 14 pages

MONEY 21 Definition of Money 21 The Functions and Requirements of Money 25 Money Value 29 Money Demand and Supply 36 Necessity for Invariable Money Value 40

STABILITY OF GOLD AND SILVER VALUES 81 Gold-Standard Prices 81 Silver-Standard Prices 94

CRITICISM OF SOME GOLD-STANDARD ARGUMENTS 98

FOREIGN COMMERCE 112

MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES 125

SOME PROPOSED CHANGES IN OUR MONEY SYSTEM 137

A NEW MONETARY SYSTEM 151 The Standard of Value 158 The Medium of Exchange 164

MERITS AND OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED 181 Merits of Plan 181 Objections Answered 187

CONCLUSION 196

INDEX 205

HONEST MONEY

VALUE AND THE STANDARD OF VALUE.

To the former they gave little attention, merely stating that while it was essential to value in exchange, the latter was not proportional to nor determined by the former, and citing air and water as familiar examples of objects having great utility, or use value, yet having little or no exchange value.

Modern economists--chiefly those of the Austrian school--have analyzed the subject more thoroughly, especially the relation between the two conceptions, and have shown that utility or subjective value, as it is generally termed by them, is an expression both of human desire and of the quantity of the necessary commodity available to satisfy such desire.

The utility of a thing grows less as the quantity of it increases, and it is the utility of the last increment of supply, or the marginal utility, that determines the subjective value of the whole supply, and it is the ratios between these subjective values that determine exchange values. Air and water, for instance, have no great utility, as viewed by the older economists, except where the supply is limited; ordinarily, their abundance makes their utility, or use value, small.

It is not essential to the purpose of this work to enter into an abstract discussion of the theory of value further than is necessary to make clear the fact that the present analysis in no way lessens or invalidates the distinction between the two conceptions of value noted by the earlier economists,--a fact which has been overlooked by some who have accepted the marginal utility theory. The distinction remains, broad and clear. The one conception, whether called "value in use," "marginal utility," or "subjective value," pertains wholly to the relation which a single good, or unit group of goods, bears to a single individual, or society unit, in respect to human well-being, and has no reference or relation to any other individual or other good.

The Austrian economist, E. von B?hm-Bawerk, says, in his "Positive Theory of Capital," p. 130:--

"Value in the subjective sense is the importance which a good, or a complex of goods, possesses with regard to the well-being of a subject."

The value of a thing may be considered either in a particular sense, with reference to some other specified thing, or it may be considered in a general sense, with reference to all other things considered as a whole. We may say the value of a bushel of wheat is two bushels of corn, meaning that these two commodities exchange for each other in that ratio; or we may speak of the value of wheat having risen or fallen, meaning that its general purchasing power, or the ratio between that and all other things taken as a unit or a whole, has increased or decreased.

The term must invariably be used or considered in a general sense, unless otherwise specifically stated, for we must always have some other thing in mind besides the one whose value we are considering; while if no other is stated, commodities in general is that thing.

Value being a ratio, it is impossible for all values to rise or fall simultaneously. The sum of subjective values may increase or decrease,--indeed it is one of the great objects of human endeavour to increase the sum of want-satisfying power,--but the sum of the ratios between these subjective values is constant. As one term of any ratio rises relative to the other, the second necessarily falls as regards the first.

This principle is so universally recognized that quotations might be given from almost every work on political economy in support of it. The following will be sufficient, however, as regards both the definition of value and this principle.

John Stuart Mill says, in his "Principles of Political Economy":--

"Value is a relative term. The value of a thing means the quantity of some other thing, or of things in general, which it exchanges for. The values of all things can never, therefore, rise or fall simultaneously. There is no such thing as a general rise or a general fall of values. Every rise of value supposes a fall, and every fall a rise."

Again, he says:--

"Things which are exchanged for one another can no more all fall, or all rise, than a dozen runners can each outstrip all the rest, or a hundred trees all overtop one another."

Prof. S. N. Patten says, in "Dynamic Economics," p. 64: "Objective values, however, are never a sum, but only a relation between subjective values. There can never be high or low objective values of commodities as a whole. It is therefore impossible to add to or subtract from them."

This latter quotation, as well as the preceding one from von B?hm-Bawerk,--both exponents of the marginal utility theory,--may help to correct a quite prevalent impression that this later theory does not distinguish between the two conceptions of value, and that because the sum of subjective values may increase, the sum of objective or exchange values can increase also.

This close connection between value and the ratio between demand and supply--value rising as the ratio increases, and falling as it grows less--is true in all cases. No other factor can affect the value of any commodity except by altering the relation or ratio between these two.

When the value of a commodity falls to or below the cost of production, or even when it approaches it so closely as to reduce the margin between the two--the producer's profit--below that in other industries, then, men will cease to produce the one and turn their labour and capital to producing the others which offer greater profit, thus lowering the supply of the abandoned product and raising that of the more profitable, thereby affecting the value of both.

The effect of this operation of the law of cost is to equalize profits and make the values of things conform to their cost or be proportional thereto.

The law can only operate when men are free to turn their labour from one industry to another. Hence arises the important exception to the law, that the values of goods produced by a monopoly are not affected by their cost of production. Only under free competition does the law operate in full force. As monopoly becomes a factor cost ceases to be, and, when the monopoly is complete, cost has no weight whatever in the determination of value.

For analogous reasons, cost enters but partially into the determination of the value of such goods as are dependent more or less on luck or chance for their production, as in the case of precious stones, gold, silver, etc.

We may use the value of anything as a measure by which to compare the values of any and all other things, but as all the factors that determine value are variable, the value of everything is variable. Any value may rise with reference to some other value, and at the same time fall with reference to a third.

We must not forget that there are two kinds of value, and that it is a standard of exchange value we are seeking. So far as it may be possible to formulate a standard of subjective value, it must consist of the pain or inutility of labour; for this kind of value pertains only to a single good, and cannot be referred to other goods without confusing it with the other conception. We cannot measure the absolute pleasure a good will give to an individual except by the pain he will undergo to get it. It is not a standard for this sort of value we want. It was evidently some such conception as the above--confusing, however, not only the two kinds of value but the two descriptions of labour--that led Adam Smith to consider labour as the ultimate standard of value. He appears also to have confused the idea of a standard of value with that of a determiner of value.

These errors were pointed out in part by Ricardo and, in part also, by J. S. Mill and later writers; hence the contention that labour is in any way a standard of value has long been abandoned by the ablest economists. The idea still lingers, however, and is frequently brought forward in current discussions, and for this reason it seems necessary to analyze briefly the relation of labour to value.

Labour is necessary to the production of all commodities, but it is not itself a commodity, nor anything which for itself is desired. It is a force, and, like every force, valuable according to the results it accomplishes. If unproductive, it has no value; if productive, its value varies according to the value of the commodities or utilities it creates. We use the terms "price of labour" or "value of labour," implying that it is the labour which is valued, and which is bought and sold; but the terms are merely a convenience. What is really bought and sold is the commodity or utility such labour has produced or will produce. If it were the labour itself, then the purchaser would receive not only the labour, but the commodity it produced, in exchange for the wages paid,--a double return,--which, of course, is absurd.

Three descriptions of labour may be distinguished in connection with the value of a commodity, viz.:--

The labour expended in its production.

The labour in general it will purchase.

The labour necessary to produce more of it.

The first kind of labour in no way affects the existing supply or demand of the commodity, and is neither a measure of its value nor a regulator or determining factor of such value. Evidences are not lacking to prove that a commodity will frequently not exchange for as much labour as was expended in producing it.

The second kind of labour, the amount in general which a commodity will purchase, depends on the amount of commodities such labour will produce, less the share which goes to capital as its reward; for, neglecting rent or classing it with capital, these two, labour and capital, are joint factors in production and divide between them the total product. It is hardly necessary to observe that labour is continually growing more efficient; that improved skill and methods enable a much larger amount of commodities in general to be produced, with a certain amount of labour, than could formerly be produced; and that labour receives, as its share of such product, a much larger amount than formerly.

The same argument applies to the third form of labour--that necessary to produce more of a commodity. This form of labour, however, is one of the factors in the cost of production, and through its effect on cost is one of the more remote factors that determine value, as explained in considering cost of production, but this does not make it in any sense a standard.

We may conclude, then, that labour in any form is not a standard of value; that, as John Stuart Mill observes, it "discards the idea of exchange value altogether, substituting a totally different idea, more analogous to value in use."

This is the only standard, or test, which can be applied to the exchange value of any commodity to determine its constancy or variability, and it is inherent in the very definition of exchange value.

The values of commodities may be compared to the surface of the ocean, which, vexed by winds and tides, is never at rest, every point continually rising or falling as compared with others. As some points rise others fall, yet there is a mean level which does not vary, and by comparison with which the variations of level of any particular point may be determined. So with values, there is a mean or average which is constant, and by referring individual values to that we can determine their fluctuations.

These ideas will become clearer as we proceed to apply them concretely to the special case of money.

MONEY.

Money has been variously defined by different writers. Perhaps the definition given by Prof. F. A. Walker, though lengthy, is the most comprehensive. He says: "Money is that which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the character or credit of the person who offers it, and without the intention of the person who receives it to consume it, or enjoy it, or to apply it to any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge of debts or full payment for commodities."

The distinction sought to be made between paper money and coin arises largely, it is thought, from the idea that coin has a value in itself which paper money has not. This idea is erroneous. Value, as we have seen, is a ratio or relation, and though the value of anything is based on a desire for it, that desire may arise either from the satisfaction which the use or consumption of it will bring, or from the belief that it can be exchanged for some other thing that will give satisfaction in use or consumption. The value of money is due to the latter of these two causes. No one wants money except for the purpose of exchanging it for other commodities; under modern conditions it is necessary for this purpose,--it is the indispensable requisite to the satisfaction of certain human wants. Money, therefore, possesses an indirect if not a direct subjective value which forms the basis of its exchange value. Paper money possesses the power of satisfying this need for money to the same extent that coin does, under like conditions, and it has, therefore, both subjective value and exchange value, and the latter is governed by the same law of supply and demand that operates in all cases.

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