Read Ebook: Lee and Longstreet at High Tide: Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records by Longstreet Helen Dortch

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Again we stood upon the same platform, in Washington, on May 30,--Memorial Day,--1902. Together we reviewed, with President Roosevelt, the magnificent column of Union veterans that marched past the President's reviewing-stand. That evening Longstreet joined me in a visit to a thousand or more soldiers of the Third Army Corps, assembled in a tent near the White House. These veterans, with a multitude of their comrades, had come to Washington to commemorate another Memorial Day in the Capitol of the Nation. The welcome given him by this crowd of old soldiers, who had fought him with all their might again and again, on many battle-fields, could hardly have been more cordial if he had found himself in the midst of an equal number of his own command. His speech to the men was felicitous, and enthusiastically cheered. In an eloquent peroration he said, "I hope to live long enough to see my surviving comrades march side by side with the Union veterans along Pennsylvania Avenue, and then I will die happy." This was the last time I met Longstreet.

Longstreet was unjustly blamed for not attacking earlier in the day, on July 2, 1863, at Gettysburg. I can answer that criticism, as I know more about the matter than the critics. If he had attacked in the morning, as it is said he should have done, he would have encountered Buford's division of cavalry, five thousand sabres, on his flank, and my corps would have been in his front, as it was in the afternoon. In a word, all the troops that opposed Longstreet in the afternoon, including the Fifth Army Corps and Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, would have been available on the left flank of the Union army in the morning. Every regiment and every battery that fired a shot in the afternoon was on the field in the morning, and would have resisted an assault in the morning as stubbornly as in the afternoon. Moreover, if the assault had been made in the morning, Law's strong brigade of Alabamians could not have assisted in the attack, as they did not arrive on the field until noon. On the other hand, if Lee had waited an hour later, I would have been on Cemetery Ridge, in compliance with General Meade's orders, and Longstreet could have marched, unresisted, from Seminary Ridge to the foot of Round Top, and might, perhaps, have unlimbered his guns on the summit.

General Meade's telegram to Halleck, dated 3 P.M., July 2, does not indicate that Lee was then about to attack him. At the time that despatch was sent, a council of corps commanders was assembled at General Meade's head-quarters. It was broken up by the sound of Longstreet's artillery. The probability is that Longstreet's attack held the Union army at Gettysburg. If Longstreet had waited until a later hour, the Union army might have been moving towards Pipe Creek, the position chosen by General Meade on June 30.

The best proof that Lee was not dissatisfied with Longstreet's movements on July 2 is the fact that Longstreet was intrusted with the command of the column of attack on July 3,--Lee's last hope at Gettysburg. Of the eleven brigades that assaulted the Union left centre on July 3, only three of them--Pickett's division--belonged to Longstreet's corps, the other eight brigades belonged to Hill's corps. If Longstreet had disappointed Lee on July 2, why would Lee, on the next day, give Longstreet a command of supreme importance, of which more than two-thirds of the troops were taken from another corps commander?

Longstreet did not look for success on July 3. He told General Lee that "the fifteen thousand men who could make a successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle," and yet the command was given to Longstreet. Why? Because the confidence of Lee in Longstreet was unshaken; because he regarded Longstreet as his most capable lieutenant.

Longstreet was never censured for the failure of the assault on July 3, although General Lee intimates, in his official report, that it was not made as early in the day as was expected. Why, then, is Longstreet blamed by them for the failure on July 2, when no fault was found by General Lee with Longstreet's dispositions on that day? The failure of both assaults must be attributed to insurmountable obstacles, which no commander could have overcome with the force at Longstreet's disposal,--seventeen thousand men on July 2, and fifteen thousand men on July 3, against thirty thousand adversaries!

General Lee says, in his report, referring to July 3,--

"General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws."

Another embarrassment prevented an earlier attack on July 2. It was the plan of General Lee to surprise the left flank of the Union army. General Lee ordered Captain Johnson, the engineer officer of his staff, to conduct Longstreet's column by a route concealed from the enemy. But the formation and movements of the attacking column had been discovered by my reconnoisance; this exposure put an end to any chance of surprise. Other dispositions became necessary; fresh orders from head-quarters were asked for; another line of advance had to be found, less exposed to view. All this took time. These circumstances were, of course, known to General Lee; hence he saw no reason to reproach Longstreet for delay.

The situation on the left flank of the Union army was entirely changed by my advance to the Emmitsburg road. Fitzhugh Lee says, "Lee was deceived by it and gave orders to attack up the Emmitsburg road, partially enveloping the enemy's left; there was much behind Sickles." The obvious purpose of my advance was to hold Lee's force in check until General Meade could bring his reserves from his right flank, at Rock Creek, to the Round Tops, on the left. Fortunately for me, General Lee believed that my line from the Peach-Orchard north--about a division front--was all Longstreet would have to deal with. Longstreet soon discovered that my left rested beyond Devil's Den, about twelve hundred yards easterly from the Emmitsburg road, and at a right angle to it. Of course, Longstreet could not push forward to Lee's objective,--the Emmitsburg road ridge,--leaving this force on his flank and rear, to take him in reverse. An obstinate conflict followed, which detained Longstreet until the Fifth Corps, which had been in reserve on the Union right, moved to the left and got into position on the Round Tops. Thus it happened that my salient at the Peach-Orchard, on the Emmitsburg road, was not attacked until six o'clock, the troops on my line, from the Emmitsburg road to the Devil's Den, having held their positions until that hour. The surprise Lee had planned was turned upon himself. The same thing would have happened if Longstreet had attacked in the morning; all the troops that resisted Longstreet in the afternoon--say thirty thousand--would have opposed him in the forenoon.

Longstreet was ordered to conceal his column of attack, for which the ground on Lee's right afforded excellent opportunities. Lee's plan was a repetition of Jackson's attack on the right flank of the Union army at Chancellorsville. In the afternoon, however, in view of the advance of my corps, General Lee was obliged to form a new plan of battle. As he believed that both of my flanks rested on the Emmitsburg road, Lee directed Longstreet to envelop my left at the Peach-Orchard, and press the attack northward "up the Emmitsburg road."

Colonel Fairfax, of Longstreet's staff, says that Lee and Longstreet were together at three o'clock, when the attack began. Lieutenant-General Hill, commanding the First Corps of Lee's army, says in his report,--

"The corps of General Longstreet was on my right, and in a line very nearly at right angles to mine. General Longstreet was to attack the left flank of the enemy, and sweep down his line, and I was ordered to co-operate with him with such of my brigades from the right as could join in with his troops in the attack. On the extreme right, Hood commenced the attack about two o'clock, McLaws about 5.30 o'clock."

Longstreet was not long in discovering, by his artillery practice, that my position at the Peach-Orchard was a salient, and that my left flank really rested twelve hundred yards eastward, at Plum Run, in the valley between Little Round Top and the Devil's Den, concealed from observation by woods; my line extended to the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, from which Lee says, "It was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond."

General J. B. Hood's story of his part in the battle of July 2, taken from a communication addressed to General Longstreet, which appears in Hood's "Advance and Retreat," pages 57-59, is a clear narrative of the movements of Longstreet's assaulting column. It emphasizes the firm adherence of Longstreet to the orders of General Lee. Again and again, as Hood plainly points out, Longstreet refused to listen to Hood's appeal for leave to turn Round Top and assail the Union rear, always replying, "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road."

These often repeated orders of General Lee to "attack up the Emmitsburg road" could not have been given until near three in the afternoon of July 2, because before that hour there was no Union line of battle on the Emmitsburg road. There had been only a few of my pickets there in the morning, thrown forward by the First Massachusetts Infantry. It distinctly appears that Lee rejected Longstreet's plan to turn the Federal left on Cemetery Ridge. And Hood makes it plain enough that Longstreet refused to listen to Hood's appeal for permission to turn Round Top, on the main Federal line, always replying, "No; General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road." Of course, that plan of battle was not formed until troops had been placed in positions commanding that road. This, we have seen, was not done until towards three in the afternoon.

The only order of battle announced by General Lee on July 2 of which there is any record was to assail my position on the Emmitsburg road, turn my left flank , and sweep the attack "up the Emmitsburg road." This was impossible until I occupied that road, and it was then that Longstreet's artillery began its practice on my advanced line.

We have seen that many circumstances required General Lee to modify his plans and orders on July 2 between daybreak, when his first reconnoisance was made, and three o'clock in the afternoon, when my advanced position was defined. We have seen that if a morning attack had been made the column would have encountered Buford's strong division of cavalry on its flank, and that it would have been weakened by the absence of Law's brigade of Hood's division. We have seen that Longstreet, even in the afternoon, when Law had come up and Buford had been sent to Westminster, was still too weak to contend against the reinforcements sent against him. We have seen that Lee was present all day on July 2, and that his own staff-officer led the column of attack. We have seen that General Lee, in his official report, gives no hint of dissatisfaction with Longstreet's conduct of the battle of July 2, nor does it appear that Longstreet was ever afterwards criticised by Lee. On the contrary, Lee points out that the same danger to Longstreet's flank, which required the protection of two divisions on July 3, existed on July 2, when his flank was unsupported. We have seen that again and again, when Hood appealed to Longstreet for leave to swing his column to the right and turn the Round Tops, Longstreet as often refused, always saying, "No; General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road." The conclusion is irrefutable, that whilst the operations were directed with signal ability and sustained by heroic courage, the failure of both assaults, that of July 2 and the other of July 3, must be attributed to the lack of strength in the columns of attack on both days, for which the commanding general alone was responsible.

It was Longstreet's good fortune to live until he saw his country hold a high place among the great powers of the world. He saw the new South advancing in prosperity, hand in hand with the North, East, and West. He saw his people in the ranks of our army, in Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, China, and Panama; he saw the Union stars and the blue uniform worn by Fitzhugh Lee, and Butler, and Wheeler. He witnessed the fulfilment of his prediction,--that the hearty reunion of the North and South would advance the welfare of both. He lived long enough to rejoice with all of us in a reunited nation, and to know that his name was honored wherever the old flag was unfurled. His fame as a soldier belongs to all Americans.

Farewell, Longstreet! I shall follow you very soon. May we meet in the happy realm where strife is unknown and friendship is eternal!

LEE AND LONGSTREET AT HIGH TIDE

THE STORY OF GETTYSBURG

Back of the day that opened so auspiciously for the Confederate cause at the first Manassas, and of the four years that followed, lies Longstreet's record of a quarter of a century in the Union army, completing one of the most lustrous pages in the world's war history. That page cannot be dimmed or darkened; it rests secure in its own white splendor, above the touch of detractors.

The detractors of General Longstreet's military integrity assert that, being opposed to fighting an offensive battle at Gettysburg, he was "balky and stubborn" in executing Lee's orders; that he disobeyed the commanding general's orders to attack at sunrise on the morning of July 2; that, again ordered to attack with half the army on the morning of July 3, his culpably slow attack with only Pickett's division, supported by some of Hill's troops, caused the fatal Confederate defeat in that encounter.

General Gordon has seen fit, in a recent publication, to revive this cruel aspersion.

When General Longstreet surrendered his sword at Appomattox his war record was made up. It stands unassailable--needing no defenders. Back of the day that opened so auspiciously for the Confederate cause at the first Manassas, and of the four years that followed, lies the record of a quarter of a century in the Union army.

In those times General Longstreet, at Cerro Gordo, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, was aiding to win the great empire of the West; in subsequent hard Indian campaigns lighting the fagots of a splendid western civilization, adding new glory to American arms and, in the struggles of a nation that fell, a new star of the first magnitude to the galaxy of American valor, completing one of the most lustrous pages in the world's war history. That page cannot be dimmed or darkened; it rests secure in its own white splendor, above the touch of detractors.

General Longstreet has of late years deemed it unnecessary to make defence of his military integrity, save such as may be found in his memoirs, "Manassas to Appomattox," published nearly ten years since. He has held that his deeds stand on the impartial pages of the nation's records--their own defender.

The cold historian of our Civil War of a hundred years hence will not go for truth to the picturesque reminiscences of General John B. Gordon, nor to the pyrotechnics of General Fitzhugh Lee, nor yet to the somewhat hysterical ravings of Rev. Mr. Pendleton and scores of other modern essayists who have sought to fix the failure of Gettysburg upon General Longstreet. The coming chronicler will cast aside the rubbish of passion and hate that followed the war, and have recourse to the nation's official war records, and in the cool, calm lights of the letters and reports of the participants, written at the time, will place the blunder of Gettysburg where it belongs. Longstreet's fame has nothing to fear in that hour.

But for the benefit of the present--of the young, the busy, who have neither time nor inclination to study the records, and for that sentiment that is increasingly shaped by the public press,--for these and other reasons it appears fitting that in this hour historical truth should have a spokesman on the Gettysburg contentions. In the absence of one more able to speak, this little story of the truth is written. The writer belongs to a generation that has come up since the gloom of Appomattox closed the drama of the great "Lost Cause" of American history--a generation that seeks the truth, unwarped and undistorted by passion, and can face the truth.

In the prosecution of my researches for the origin of the extraordinary calumnies aimed at General Longstreet's honor as a soldier, two most significant facts have continually pressed upon my attention.

First, not one word appears to have been published openly accusing him of disobedience at Gettysburg until the man who could forever have silenced all criticism was in his grave--until the knightly soul of Robert Edward Lee had passed into eternity.

Second, General Longstreet's operations on the field of Gettysburg were above the suspicion of reproach until he came under the political ban in the South, for meeting in the proper spirit, as he saw it, the requirements of good citizenship in the observance of his Appomattox parole, and, after the removal of his political disabilities, for having accepted office at the hands of a Republican President who happened to be his old West Point comrade,--Grant.

Then the storm broke. He was heralded as traitor, deserter of his people, deserter of Democracy, etc. In the fury of this onslaught originated the cruel slander that he had disobeyed Lee's most vital orders, causing the loss of the Gettysburg battle and the ultimate fall of the Confederate cause. Most singularly, this strange discovery was not made until some years after the battle and General Lee's death. Thereafter for two decades the South was sedulously taught to believe that the Federal victory was wholly the fortuitous outcome of the culpable disobedience of General Longstreet.

The sectional complaint that he deserted "Democracy" is about as relevant and truthful as the assertion that he lost Gettysburg. He was a West Pointer, a professional soldier. He had never cast a ballot before the Civil War; he had no politics. Its passions and prejudices had no dwelling-place in his mind. The war was over, and he quietly accepted the result, fraternizing with all Americans. It was no great crime.

But the peculiar circumstances favored an opportunity to make Longstreet the long-desired scape-goat for Gettysburg. There was an ulterior and deeper purpose, however, than merely besmirching his military record. Short-sighted partisans seemingly argued that the disparagement of Longstreet was necessary to save the military reputation of Lee. But Lee's great fame needed no such sacrifice.

The outrageous charges against Longstreet have been wholly disproved. Much of the partisan rancor that once pursued him has died out. Many of the more intelligent Southerners have been long convinced that he was the victim of a great wrong.

It was unworthy of Major-General John B. Gordon, once of the army of Northern Virginia, to revive this dead controversy. He simply reiterates the old charges in full, produces no evidence in their support, and gratuitously endorses a false and cruel verdict. His contribution is of no historical value. It carries inherent evidence that General Gordon made no critical examination of the documentary history of Gettysburg. He assumes to render a verdict on the say-so of others.

Gordon's unsupported assertions would require no attention but for one fact. Both South and North there is a widespread impression that Gordon was a conspicuous figure at Gettysburg. This is erroneous. He was merely a brigade commander there, stationed five miles from Longstreet. It is not certain that he personally saw either Lee or Longstreet while the army was in Pennsylvania.

In his official report Gordon uses this language regarding the operations of his own small command at Gettysburg when the heaviest fighting was going on, finely showing the scope of his opportunities for observation:

"The movements during the succeeding days of the battle, July 2 and 3, I do not consider of sufficient importance to mention."

It is but just to Gordon, however, to say that in his subordinate capacity at the head of one of the thirty-seven brigades of infantry comprising Lee's army, he performed excellent service on the first day's battle. But in estimating his value as a personal witness, the foregoing undisputed facts must be taken into consideration. His testimony is obviously of the hearsay kind. In fact, as will be observed from his own admission, it is no more than his own personal conclusions, wholly deduced from the assertions of others, based on an assumed state of facts which did not exist.

In his recent publication, "Reminiscences of the Civil War," Gordon says,--

"It now seems certain that impartial military critics, after thorough investigation, will consider the following facts established:

"First, that General Lee distinctly ordered Longstreet to attack early on the morning of the second day, and if Longstreet had done so two of the largest corps of Meade's army would not have been in the fight; but Longstreet delayed the fight until four o'clock in the afternoon, and thus lost his opportunity of occupying Little Round Top, the key of the position, which he might have done in the morning without firing a shot or losing a man."

It is competent to point out that Longstreet's orders from General Lee were "to move around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left." In short, he was "to attack up the Emmitsburg road," as all the authorities agree. He therefore could not well "occupy" Little Round Top up the Emmitsburg road, because it was but a fraction less than a mile to the east of that road. It is as clear as noonday that Lee had no thought at first, if ever, that Little Round Top was the "key to the position." Lee merely contemplated driving the enemy from some high ground on the Emmitsburg road from which the "more elevated ground" of Cemetery Hill in its rear, more than a mile to the northward of Little Round Top, could be subsequently assailed.

"... In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to carry this position.... After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground.... The battle ceased at dark."

The "desired ground" captured was that held by Sickles's Federal Third Corps,--the celebrated peach-orchard, wheat-field, and adjacent high ground, from which Cemetery Hill was next day assailed by the Confederate artillery as a prelude to Pickett's infantry assault.

It was the "crest of the ridge," not the Round Top, that Lee wished to assail. His eye from the first appears to have been steadily fixed upon the Federal centre. That is why he ordered the "attack up the Emmitsburg road."

Longstreet's official report is very explicit on this point. It was written July 27, 1863. On page 358 of the same book he says,--

"I received instructions from the commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left."

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