Read Ebook: Studies on Slavery in Easy Lessons by Fletcher John

Font size: 10 px 15 px 20 px 25 px 30 px 35 px

Background color: BlackWhiteGrayLight GrayDark GrayDim Gray

Text color: BlackWhiteGrayLight GrayDark GrayDim Gray

Apply/Save settings

Ebook has 1625 lines and 265144 words, and 33 pages

STUDIES ON SLAVERY.

THIS author informs us that he has been many years preparing the work, with a view to furnish his pupils with a text-book free from the errors of Paley. Like Paley, whom he evidently wishes to supersede, he has devoted a portion of his strength to the abolition of slavery. We propose to look into the book with an eye to that subject alone. President Wayland says:

P. 24. "Moral Law is a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results."

Pp. 25, 26. "An order of sequence established, supposes, of necessity, an Establisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of a Universal Cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of his enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, is just as inviolable as an order of sequence in physics.

"Such being the fact, it is evident that the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The results which God has connected with actions will inevitably occur, all the created power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding.

"A higher authority has admonished us, 'Be not deceived; God is not mocked; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.' It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs."

To this doctrine we yield the highest approval.

The first obvious deduction from the lesson here advanced is, that the laws of God, as once revealed to man, never lose their high moral qualities nor their divine character, at any subsequent age of the world. The law, which God delivered to Moses from Mount Sinai, authorizing his chosen people to buy slaves, and hold them as an inheritance for their children after them, is, therefore, the law of God now. The action of the law may be suspended at a particular time or place, from a change of contingencies,--yet the law stands unaffected.

We hope no one doubts the accuracy of the doctrine thus fairly stated in these "Elements." But we shall see how fatal it is to some portions of the author's positions concerning slavery. And we propose to show how this doctrine, as connected with slavery, has been, and is elucidated in scripture. The twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy shows that the fruits of wickedness are all manner of curses, finally terminating in slavery or death.

The biblical scholar will recollect a multitude of instances where this doctrine is clearly advanced, recognising sin as the antecedent of slavery.

From the wording of the covenant it is evident that Abraham had slaves before the covenant was made, since it embraced regulations concerning slaves, but, in no instance, hints that the existence of slavery was adverse to the law of God, or that the holding of slaves, as slaves, was contrary to his will. The deduction is, that slavery exists in the world by Divine appointment; and that the act of owning slaves is in conformity with the moral law.

The abuse of slavery, like the abuse of any thing else, is doubtless a great sin. Of the blessings God bestows on man, there is perhaps no one he does not abuse; and while we examine the laws of God, as presenting to the mind the vast field of cause and effect,--of antecedent and consequent,--we may be led to a reflection on the necessity of a conformity thereto, lest a long continuance of such abuses shall become the antecedent to future calamities and woes, either to ourselves or posterity; woes and calamities prefigured by those nations and tribes already under the infliction of slavery, as a just punishment of sin.

In those "Elements of Moral Science," we find the following, p. 29:

But, however unhappy may be the reflection, too large a proportion of the human family will not fall within that class. How often do we see among men, otherwise having some claim to be classed with the intelligent, those of acknowledged bad habits; habits which directly force the sufferer downward to poverty, disgrace, disease, imbecility, and death,--on whom argument addressed to their "consciousness of right and wrong," "is water spilled on the ground."

Children, whose ancestors have, for ages, ranked among the highly cultivated of the earth,--each generation surpassing its predecessor in knowledge, in science, and religion,--have been found to degenerate, oftener than otherwise, when trained solely by arguments addressed to their reason, and unaccompanied by physical compulsion.

What then are we to expect from man in a savage state, whose ancestors have been degenerating from generation to generation, through untold ages,--him, who has scarcely a feeling in common with civilized man, except such as is common to the mere animal,--him, whom deteriorating causes have reduced to the lowest grade above the brute?

Domberger spent twelve years in passing through the central parts of Africa, from north to south. He found the negroes, in a large district of country, in a state of total brutality. Their habits were those only of the wild brutes. They had no fixed residences. They lay down wherever they might be when disposed to sleep. They were not more gregarious than the wild goats. So far as he could discover, they had not a language even, by which to hold intercourse with each other. They possessed no power by which they were enabled to exhibit moral degradation, any more than the wild beasts.

Hanno, the Carthaginian navigator, in his Periplus, eight hundred years before the birth of Christ, gives a similar account of a race he calls Gaetuli.

It is possible that man, in these extreme cases, where there is very little to unlearn, might sooner be regenerated, elevated to civilization, physical and mental power, than in other cases where there may be far more proof of mental capacity, but where the worst of intellectual and physical habits have stained soul and body with, perhaps, a more indelible degradation.

It would be a curious experiment, and add much to our knowledge of the races of man, to ascertain how many generations, under the most favourable treatment, it would require to produce an equal to Moses, or a David, a Newton, or the learned Dr. Wayland himself, from these specimens of man presented before us! And we now inquire, what course of treatment will you propose, as the most practical, to elevate such a race to civilization?

It appears to us God has decided that slavery is the most effectual.

It is highly probable that among savage tribes, punishment and the infliction of pain are often applied with no higher view than to torture the object of displeasure. But to us it seems remarkably unfortunate, in a student of moral and civil jurisprudence, to suggest that legal punishment, among civilized men, is ever awarded or ordered with any such feeling. If our education has given us a correct view of the subject, the man who inflicts pain even on the brute, solely on the account of such a feeling, instantly, so far as it is known, sinks to the grade of a savage; and much more explicitly when the object of revenge is his fellow man. On the contrary, when "the offender" has given unquestionable evidence of a depravity too deeply seated for any hope of regeneration, and the law orders his death, it selects that mode of execution which inflicts the least suffering, and which shall have also the greatest probable influence to deter others who may be downward bound in the road of moral deterioration. There never has been a code of laws among civilized nations, where the object of punishment was to inflict pain on the implicated; only so far as was thought necessary to influence a change of action for the better. The object of punishment invariably has been the improvement of society.

The learned Doctor says:

And for proof, he adds: "This is the case in respect to all other distinct qualities: it is, surely, reasonable to suppose, that it would be the case in this."

What! have we a distinct faculty by which we determine one thing to be red, and another distinct faculty by which we discover a thing to be black; another distinct faculty by which we judge a thing to be a cube, and another distinct faculty by which we determine it to be a triangle? Have we one distinct faculty by which we find a melon, and another by which we find a gourd? What! one distinct faculty by which we determine a professor of moral philosophy to be a correct teacher, and another by which we discover him to be a visionary?

Why does he not at once borrow support from the extravagancies of phrenology, and assert, according to the notions of its teachers, that, since the brain is divided into distinct organs for the exercise of each distinct faculty, therefore there must be a distinct faculty for the conception of each idea? There is surely an evident relation between this theory of the author and the doctrines of Gall; nor will the world fail to associate it with the phantasies of Mesmer.

But we ask the author and his pupils to apply to this theory the truism of Professor Dodd: "It is, at all times, a sufficient refutation of what purports to be a statement of facts, to show that the only kind of evidence by which the facts could possibly be sustained, does not exist."

The practice is, the child is taught by them that slavery is very wicked; that no slaveholder can be a good man; and much of such matter. Books are put into the hands of the schoolboy and the youth, inculcating similar lessons, fraught with lamentation and sympathy for the imaginary woes of the slave, and hatred and disgust towards the master; and when maturer years are his, he is asked if he does not feel that slavery is very wicked; and the professors of moral philosophy then inform him that he feels so because he possesses "a distinct mental faculty"--distinct from the judgment--which teaches those who cultivate it, infallibly, all that is right and wrong; that this conscience, or moral sense, is more to be relied on than the Bible--than the ancient inspirations of God!

Hence, Channing says:

And Barnes, on Slavery, says:

P. 381. "If the Bible could be shown to defend and countenance slavery as a good institution, it would make thousands of infidels; for there are multitudes of minds that will see more clearly that slavery is against all the laws which God has written on the human soul, than they would see, that a book, sanctioning such a system, had evidence of Divine origin."

And this same author makes Dr. Wayland say:

P. 310. "Well may we ask, in the words of Dr. Wayland, whether there was ever such a moral superstructure raised on such a foundation? The doctrine of purgatory from a verse of Maccabees; the doctrine of papacy from the saying of Christ to Peter; the establishment of the Inquisition from the obligation to extend the knowledge of religious truth, all seem nothing to it. If the religion of Christ allows such a license from such precepts as these, the New Testament would be the greatest curse that ever was inflicted on our race."

This book, as quoted by Barnes, we have not seen.

Torture the hallowed pages of the Bible, To sanction crime, and robbery, and blood, And, in oppression's hateful service, libel 'Both man and God!'"

The ignorant fanaticism, so proudly buoyant even in repose upon its ill-digested reason,--here so flippantly uttered,--to us bespeaks a dangerous man, in whatever station he may be found. The most hateful idolatry has never presented to the world a stronger proof of a distorted imagination giving vent to the rankest falsehood. It is to be deeply regretted that such intellects are ever permitted to have any influence upon the minds of the young. We deem it would be a fearful inquiry, to examine how far the strange assassinations, lately so common at the North, have been the direct result of that mental training of which we here see an example. We fear too little is thought of the quick transition from this erroneous theology to the darkened paths of man when enlightened alone by his own depraved heart.

The saying is true, however awful: He who rejects or dispels the plain meaning of the Bible, rejects our God, and is an idolater; and God alone can give bound to his wicked conceptions.

The foregoing extracts show us a specimen of the arguments and conclusions emanating from the doctrine that the conscience is a distinct mental power, and that it infallibly teaches what is right before God. We deem it quite objectionable--quite erroneous!

Most men live without reflection. They think of nothing but the objects of sense, of pressing want, and the means of relief. The wonderful works of nature create no wonder. A mine of sea-shells on the Andes excites no surprise. Of the analogies or dissimilarities between things, or their essential relations, the mind takes no notice. Even their intellectual powers exist almost without their cognisance. Their mental faculties are little improved or cultivated; and, as they are forced to the Gazetteer for the description of some distant locality, so they would be to their logic, before they could speak of their own mental functions.

Thus we see there is a class of theologians, who, in hot pursuit of abolitionism, seem ready to sacrifice their Bible and its religion to the establishment of such principles as they deem wholly contradictory to, and incompatible with, the existence of slavery; and it is hence that they attempt to teach that man possesses an intuitive sense of its wrong. But shall we not be forced, with regret, to acknowledge, that there are quacks in divinity as well as in physic?

We do not charge Dr. Wayland with being the author of this new doctrine that man possesses an independent and distinct power, faculty, or sense, by the exercise of which he perceives right and wrong, or, in other words, the moral quality of the actions of men, and upon which perception he may rest with safety, as to its accuracy and truthfulness; for the same doctrine has been suggested by greater men than Dr. Wayland, long ago. Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutchinson, and Dr. Reid have laid the foundation; the latter of whom says, "The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it." Again: "As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the figures and colours of bodies about us, we have the same reason, with security, to rely upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience with regard to what we ought or ought not to do."

Such sentiments may seem to some to be deducible from an indistinct and indefinite reference to our judgment after the understanding has been improved by moral culture, when such judgment, by a mere looseness of language, is sometimes described as if the writers confounded it with the state of mind and moral perfectibility produced by the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Archbishop Secker, in his Fourth Lecture on the Catechism, says:

"How shall all persons know what they are taught to believe is really true?

Now it is evident that the bishop's answer is predicated upon the supposition that the understanding has been cultivated in conformity to the principles of moral truth.

But, from such hasty, perhaps thoughtless, snatches of speculation, occasionally found in some few of the older metaphysical writers, our author and his co-associates in this belief have drawn their materials, remodelled the parts, and reared, even as to heaven, a lofty structure upon a doubtful, tottering base, bringing untold social and political evils upon society, and spiritual death, in its fall, to all who shelter under it. But for the good of the world, in opposition to such a doctrine, truth has erected her column of solid masonry, against which the fanaticism and sophistry of these builders can only, like successive drops of water, carry down the walls some useless portions of the cement.

We repeat, how tottering must be the argument founded upon analogy where there is no relation! We all agree that the senses make truthful representations: all see, smell, and taste alike; vinegar will be sour to the savage, as well as the savant. But is their judgment the same about the moral qualities of actions? What says this moral sense, this conscience, in the savage, who is taught to steal from his friend and torture his enemy? Does the reverend doctor think his moral sense will dictate the same conclusion? What right has he, then, to say, it is the voice of nature--of God? Does he fail to perceive that the moral quality of actions is distinguished by man in conformity to his experience, his training, his education?

We see that men often differ about the moral quality of an action. It might be that no two men would have the same idea about the moral quality of a particular action. Would the conscience, this moral sense, or faculty, in such case, be right in each one? If not, who is to determine which is right and which is wrong? And further, of what use to man can be this distinct, independent, and unchangeably truthful power, which, nevertheless, brings him no certainty? But has the mind of man ever found out that God has overdone, or unnecessarily done, any thing? Will these theorists reflect, that, in case God had seen fit to bestow such a sense on man, inspiration would have been useless, and the Bible not wanted? And the condition of man upon the earth would be wholly stationary instead of progressive. And permit us to inquire, whether this notion of theirs is the reason why some of these theorists speak so rashly, we might say blasphemously, of that sacred volume, upon the condition which they dictate?

The truth is, we have no such infallible guide. The idea of right and wrong, either theologically or physically considered, is always fixed through an exertion of the powers of the understanding. We have no instinctive power reaching the case. Our judgment, our feelings are often unstable, irregular, and sometimes antagonistic. In abstruse cases, very often we cannot even satisfy ourselves what is right and will it be said that we do not often fail to see the object, design, and law of God touching a case?

On every decision on a question of right or wrong, a train of mental action is called into operation, comparing the ideas already in the mind with the facts of the case under review, and noting the similarity of these facts to our idea of right, or whether the facts conform to our idea of wrong. This decision we call judgment: but when the decision reaches to the question of right or wrong, touching our own conduct only, logicians have agreed to call it conscience; not a distinct action from judgment--much less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof of accuracy and correctness than is our judgment about any other matter, where the ideas and facts are equally manifest and accurately presented.

There is another consideration which to us gives proof that the conscience or moral sense is not an independent faculty of the mind, nor to be relied on at all as infallible. Many of us have noticed the changes that imperceptibly come over our moral feelings, and judgment of right and wrong, conscience or moral sense, through the influences of association and habit. Our affluent neighbour, who manifests to others many virtues and some follies, our mind, by association and habit, regards as a perfect model of human greatness and perfection. Thus a corrupt government soon surveys a corrupt people; and a somewhat licentious, but talented and accomplished clergyman, soon finds his hearers in fashion. Nor is it unfrequent, that which should stigmatize a father is beheld with admiration by the son. Thus wealth, to most, is desirable, but its desirability has been created by association; we recollect the objects it enables us to command, often the objects of our principal pursuit. The quality the mind associates with these gratifications, it eventually associates with that which procures them. Thus, we perceive, the mind is able to form a moral estimate upon considerations wholly artificial, which could never happen in case the moral sense was independent, and a distinct faculty teaching us infallible truth.

But how are we to account for the fact that some of the finest intellects, as well as the most learned men, have fallen into this most dangerous error? It should be a subject of deep thought!

Share on: WhatsApp @Hash Facebook Tweet