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CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

Rally of Athens, during the year after the defeat at Syracuse. B.C. 412.--Commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred at Athens--Alkibiad?s.--Order from Sparta to kill Alkibiad?s.--He escapes, retires to Tissaphern?s, and becomes adviser of the Persians.--He advises the satrap to assist neither of the Grecian parties heartily--but his advice leans towards Athens, with a view to his own restoration.--Alkibiad?s acts as negotiator for Tissaphern?s at Magnesia.--Diminution of the rate of pay furnished by Tissaphern?s to the Peloponnesians.--Alkibiad?s opens correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. He originates the scheme of an oligarchical revolution at Athens.--Conspiracy arranged between the Athenian officer and Alkibiad?s.--Oligarchical Athenians--the hetaeries, or political clubs. Peisander is sent to push forward the conspiracy at Athens.--Credulity of the oligarchical conspirators.--Opposition of Phrynichus at Samos to the conspirators, and to Alkibiad?s.--Manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres of Phrynichus and Alkibiad?s.--Proceedings of Peisander at Athens--strong opposition among the people both to the conspiracy and to the restoration of Alkibiad?s.--Unwilling vote of the assembly to relinquish their democracy, under the promise of Persian aid for the war. Peisander is sent back to negotiate with Alkibiad?s.--Peisander brings the oligarchical clubs at Athens into organized action against the democracy.--Peisander leaves Athens for Samos--Antiphon takes the management of the oligarchical conspiracy--Theramen?s and Phrynichus.--Military operations near the Asiatic coast.--Negotiations of Peisander with Alkibiad?s.--Tricks of Alkibiad?s--he exaggerates his demands, with a view of breaking off the negotiation--indignation of the oligarchs against him.--Reconciliation between Tissaphern?s and the Peloponnesians.--Third convention concluded between them.--Third convention compared with the two preceding.--Loss of Or?pus by Athens.--Peisander and his colleagues persist in the oligarchical conspiracy, without Alkibiad?s.--They attempt to subvert the democracy at Samos--assassination of Hyperbolus and others.--The democracy at Samos is sustained by the Athenian armament.--The Athenian Parali--defeat of the oligarchical conspiracy at Samos.--The Paralus is sent to Athens with the news.--Progress of the oligarchical conspiracy at Athens--dextrous management of Antiphon.--Language of the conspirators--juggle about naming Five Thousand citizens to exercise the political franchise exclusively.--Assassination of the popular speakers by Antiphon and the oligarchical party.--Return of Peisander to Athens--oligarchical government established in several of the allied cities.--Consummation of the revolution at Athens--last public assembly at Kol?nus.--Abolition of the Graph? Paranom?n.--New government proposed by Peisander--oligarchy of Four Hundred.--Fictitious and nominal aggregate called the Five Thousand.--The Four Hundred install themselves in the senate-house, expelling the senators by armed force.--Remarks on this revolution.--Attachment to constitutional forms at Athens--use made of this sentiment by Antiphon, to destroy the constitution.--Demagogues the indispensable counterpoise and antithesis to the oligarchs.--Proceedings of the Four Hundred in the government.--They make overtures for peace to Agis, and to the Spartans.--They send envoys to the camp at Samos.--First news of the revolution is conveyed to the camp by Chaereas--strong sentiment in the camp against the Four Hundred.--Ardent democratical manifestation, and emphatic oath, taken both by the Athenian armament at Samos and by the Samians.--The Athenian democracy is reconstituted by the armament--public assembly of the soldiers--new generals chosen.--Alkibiad?s opens correspondence with the democratical armament at Samos.--Alkibiad?s comes to Samos, on the invitation of the armament.--Confidence placed by the armament in his language and promises--they choose him one of their generals.--New position of Alkibiad?s--present turn of his ambition.--The envoys of the Four Hundred reach Samos--are indignantly sent back by the armament.--Eagerness of the armament to sail to Peiraeus--is discountenanced by Alkibiad?s--his answer to the envoys.--Dissuasive advice of Alkibiad?s--how far it is to be commended as sagacious.--Envoys sent from Argos to the "Athenian Demos at Samos."--Return of the envoys of the Four Hundred from Samos to Athens--bad prospects of the oligarchy.--Mistrust and discord among the Four Hundred themselves. An opposition party formed under Theramen?s.--Theramen?s demands that the Five Thousand shall be made a reality.--Measures of Antiphon and the Four Hundred--their solicitations to Sparta--construction of the fort of Ectioneia, for the admission of a Spartan garrison.--Unaccountable backwardness of the Lacedaemonians.--Assassination of Phrynichus--Lacedaemonian fleet hovering near Peiraeus.--Rising at Athens against the Four Hundred--demolition of the new fort at Ectioneia.--Decline of the Four Hundred--concessions made by them--renewal of the public assembly.--Lacedaemonian fleet threatens Peiraeus--passes by to Euboea.--Naval battle near Eretria--Athenians defeated--Euboea revolts.--Dismay at Athens--her ruin inevitable, if the Lacedaemonians had acted with energy.--The Four Hundred are put down--the democracy in substance restored.--Moderation of political antipathies, and patriotic spirit, now prevalent.--The Five Thousand--a number never exactly realized--were soon enlarged into universal citizenship.--Restoration of the complete democracy, all except pay.--Psephism of Demophantus--democratical oath prescribed.--Flight of most of the leaders of the Four Hundred to Dekeleia.--Theramen?s stands forward to accuse the remaining leaders of the Four Hundred, especially in reference to the fort at Ectioneia, and the embassy to Sparta.--Antiphon tried, condemned, and executed.--Treatment of the Four Hundred generally.--Favorable judgment of Thucydid?s on the conduct of the Athenians.--Oligarchy at Athens, democracy at Samos--contrast. 1-93

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

Embarrassed state of Athens after the Four Hundred.--Peloponnesian fleet--revolt of Abydos from Athens.--Strombichid?s goes from Chios to the Hellespont--improved condition of the Chians.--Discontent in the Peloponnesian fleet at Mil?tus.--Strombichid?s returns from Chios to Samos.--Peloponnesian squadron and force at the Hellespont--revolt of Byzantium from Athens.--Discontent and meeting against Astyochus at Mil?tus.--The Spartan commissioner Lichas enjoins the Milesians to obey Tissaphern?s--discontent of the Milesians.--Mindarus supersedes Astyochus as admiral.--Phenician fleet at Aspendus--duplicity of Tissaphern?s.--Alkibiad?s at Aspendus--his double game between Tissaphern?s and the Athenians.--Phenicians sent back from Aspendus without action--motives of Tissaphern?s.--Mindarus leaves Mil?tus with his fleet--goes to Chios--Thrasyllus and the Athenian fleet at Lesbos.--Mindarus eludes Thrasyllus, and reaches the Hellespont.--Athenian Hellespontine squadron escapes from Sestos in the night.--Thrasyllus and the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont.--Battle of Kynoss?ma--victory of the Athenian fleet.--Rejoicing at Athens for the victory.--Bridge across the Euripus, joining Euboea with Boeotia.--Revolt of Kyzikus.--Zeal of Pharnabazus against Athens--importance of Persian money.--Tissaphern?s again courts the Peloponnesians.--Alkibiad?s returns from Aspendus to Samos.--Farther combats at the Hellespont.--Theramen?s sent out with reinforcements from Athens.--Renewed troubles at Korkyra.--Alkibiad?s is seized by Tissaphern?s and confined at Sardis.--Escape of Alkibiad?s--concentration of the Athenian fleet--Mindarus besieges Kyzikus.--Battle of Kyzikus--victory of the Athenians--Mindarus is slain, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet taken.--Discouragement of the Spartans--proposition to Athens for peace.--The Lacedaemonian Endius at Athens--his propositions for peace.--Refused by Athens--opposition of Kleophon.--Grounds of the opposition of Kleophon.--Question of policy as it then stood, between war and peace.--Strenuous aid of Pharnabazus to the Peloponnesians--Alkibiad?s and the Athenian fleet at the Bosphorus.--The Athenians occupy Chrysopolis, and levy toll on the ships passing through the Bosphorus.--The Lacedaemonians are expelled from Thasus.--Klearchus the Lacedaemonian is sent to Byzantium.--Thrasyllus sent from Athens to Ionia.--Thrasyllus and Alkibiad?s at the Hellespont.--Pylos is retaken by the Lacedaemonians--disgrace of the Athenian Anytus for not relieving it.--Capture of Chalk?don by Alkibiad?s and the Athenians.--Convention concluded by the Athenians with Pharnabazus.--Byzantium captured by the Athenians.--Pharnabazus conveys some Athenian envoys towards Susa, to make terms with the Great King. 93-135

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE.

Cyrus the younger--effects of his coming down to Asia Minor.--Pharnabazus detains the Athenian envoys.--Lysander--Lacedaemonian admiral in Asia.--Proceedings of the preceding admiral, Kratesippidas.--Lysander visits Cyrus at Sardis.--His dexterous policy--he acquires the peculiar esteem of Cyrus.--Abundant pay of the Peloponnesian armament, furnished by Cyrus.--Factions organized by Lysander among the Asiatic cities.--Proceedings of Alkibiad?s in Thrace and Asia.--His arrival at Athens.--Feelings and details connected with his arrival.--Unanimous welcome with which he is received.--Effect produced upon Alkibiad?s.--Sentiment of the Athenians towards him.--Disposition to refrain from dwelling on his previous wrongs, and to give him a new trial.--Mistaken confidence and intoxication of Alkibiad?s.--He protects the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries by land, against the garrison of Dekeleia.--Fruitless attempt of Agis to surprise Athens.--Alkibiad?s sails with an armament to Asia--ill-success at Andros--entire failure in respect to hopes from Persia.--Lysander at Ephesus--his cautious policy, refusing to fight--disappointment of Alkibiad?s.--Alkibiad?s goes to Phokaea, leaving his fleet under the command of Antiochus--oppression by Alkibiad?s at Kym?.--Complaints of the Kymaeans at Athens--defeat of Antiochus at Notium during the absence of Alkibiad?s.--Dissatisfaction and complaint in the armament against Alkibiad?s.--Murmur and accusation against him transmitted to Athens.--Alteration of sentiment at Athens--displeasure of the Athenians against him.--Reasonable grounds of such alteration and displeasure.--Different behavior towards Nikias and towards Alkibiad?s.--Alkibiad?s is dismissed from his command--ten generals named to succeed him--he retires to the Chersonese.--Konon and his colleagues--capture and liberation of the Rhodian Dorieus by the Athenians.--Kallikratidas supersedes Lysander--his noble character.--Murmurs and ill-will against Kallikratidas--energy and rectitude whereby he represses them.--His spirited behavior in regard to the Persians.--His appeal to the Milesians--Pan-Hellenic feelings.--He fits out a commanding fleet--his success at Lesbos--he liberates the captives and the Athenian garrison at Methymna.--Noble character of this proceeding--exalted Pan-Hellenic patriotism of Kallikratidas.--He blocks up Konon and the Athenian fleet at Mityl?n?.--Triumphant position of Kallikratidas.--Hopeless condition of Konon--his stratagem to send news to Athens and entreat relief.--Kallikratidas defeats the squadron of Diomedon.--Prodigious effort of the Athenians to relieve Konon--large Athenian fleet equipped and sent to Arginusae--Kallikratidas withdraws most of his fleet from Mityl?n?, leaving Eteonikus to continue the blockade.--The two fleets marshalled for battle.--Comparative nautical skill, reversed since the beginning of the war.--Battle of Arginusae--defeat of the Lacedaemonians--death of Kallikratidas.--It would have been better for Greece, and even for Athens, if Kallikratidas had been victor at Arginusae.--Safe escape of Eteonikus and his fleet from Mityl?n? to Chios.--Joy of Athens for the victory--indignation arising from the fact that the Athenian seamen on the disabled ships had not been picked up after the battle.--State of the facts about the disabled ships, and the men left in them.--Despatch of the generals to Athens, affirming that a storm had prevented them from saving the drowning men.--Justifiable wrath and wounded sympathy of the Athenians--extreme excitement among the relatives of the drowned men.--The generals are superseded, and directed to come home.--Examination of the generals before the senate and the people at Athens.--Debate in the public assembly--Theramen?s accuses the generals as guilty of omitting to save the drowning men.--Effect of the accusation by Theramen?s upon the assembly.--Defence of the generals--they affirm that they had commissioned Theramen?s himself to undertake the duty.--Reason why the generals had not mentioned this commission in their despatch.--Different account given by Diodorus.--Probable version of the way in which the facts really occurred.--Justification of the generals--how far valid?--The alleged storm. Escape of Eteonikus.--Feelings of the Athenian public--how the case stood before them--decision adjourned to a future assembly.--Occurrence of the festival of Apaturia--the great family solemnity of the Ionic race.--Burst of feeling at the Apaturia--misrepresented by Xenophon.--Proposition of Kallixenus in the senate against the generals--adopted and submitted to the public assembly.--Injustice of the resolution--by depriving the generals of the customary securities for judicial trial. Psephism of Kann?nus.--Opposition taken by Euryptolemus on the ground of constitutional form.--Graph? Paranom?n.--Excitement of the assembly--constitutional impediment overruled.--The prytanes refuse to put the question--their opposition overruled, all except that of Sokrat?s.--Altered temper of the assembly when the discussion had begun--amendment moved and developed by Euryptolemus.--Speech of Euryptolemus.--His amendment is rejected--the proposition of Kallixenus is carried.--The six generals are condemned and executed.--Injustice of the proceeding--violation of the democratical maxims and sentiments.--Earnest repentance of the people soon afterwards--disgrace and end of Kallixenus.--Causes of the popular excitement.--Generals--not innocent men. 135-210

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY.

Alleged propositions of peace from Sparta to Athens--doubtful.--Eteonikus at Chios--distress of his seamen--conspiracy suppressed.--Solicitations from Chios and elsewhere that Lysander should be sent out again.--Arrival of Lysander at Ephesus--zeal of his partisans--Cyrus.--Violent revolution at Mil?tus by the partisans of Lysander.--Cyrus goes to visit his dying father--confides his tributes to Lysander.--Inaction of the Athenian fleet after the battle of Arginusae.--Operations of Lysander.--Both fleets at the Hellespont.--Athenian fleet at AEgospotami.--Battle of AEgospotami--surprise and capture of the entire Athenian fleet.--Capture of the Athenian commanders, all except Konon.--Slaughter of the captive generals and prisoners.--The Athenian fleet supposed to have been betrayed by its own commanders.--Distress and agony at Athens, when the defeat of AEgospotami was made known there.--Proceedings of Lysander.--Miserable condition of the Athenian kleruchs, and of the friends of Athens in the allied dependencies.--Suffering in Athens.--Amnesty proposed by Patrokleid?s, and adopted.--Oath of mutual harmony sworn in the acropolis.--Arrival of Lysander. Athens is blocked up by sea and land.--Resolute holding-out of the Athenians--their propositions for capitulating are refused.--Pretences of Theramen?s--he is sent as envoy--his studied delay.--Misery and famine in Athens--death of Kleophon.--The famine becomes intolerable--Theramen?s is sent to obtain peace on any terms--debate about the terms at Sparta.--Peace is granted by Sparta, against the general sentiment of the allies.--Surrender of Athens--extreme wretchedness--number of deaths from famine.--Lysander enters Athens--return of the exiles--demolition of the Long Walls--dismantling of Peiraeus--fleet given up.--The exiles and the oligarchical party in Athens--their triumphant behavior and devotion to Lysander.--Kritias and other exiles--past life of Kritias.--Kritias at the head of the oligarchs at Athens.--Oligarchical leaders named at Athens.--Seizure of Strombichid?s and other eminent democrats.--Nomination of the Thirty, under the dictation of Lysander.--Conquest of Samos by Lysander--oligarchy restored there.--Triumphant return of Lysander to Sparta--his prodigious ascendency throughout Greece.--Proceedings of the Thirty at Athens--feelings of oligarchical men like Plato.--The Thirty begin their executions--Strombichid?s and the imprisoned generals put to death--other democrats also.--Senate appointed by the Thirty--is only trusted to act under their intimidation. Numerous executions without trial.--The senate began by condemning willingly everyone brought before them.--Discord among the Thirty--dissentient views of Kritias and Theramen?s.--Lacedaemonian garrison introduced--multiplied executions by Kritias and the Thirty.--Opposition of Theramen?s to these measures--violence and rapacity still farther increased--rich and oligarchical men put to death.--Plan of Kritias to gain adherents by forcing men to become accomplices in deeds of blood--resistance of Sokrat?s.--Terror and discontent in the city--the Thirty nominate a body of Three Thousand as partisan hoplites.--They disarm the remaining hoplites of the city.--Murders and spoliations by the Thirty. Seizure of the Metics.--Seizure of Lysias the rhetor and his brother Polemarchus. The former escapes--the latter is executed.--Increased exasperation of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against Theramen?s.--Theramen?s is denounced by Kritias in the Senate--speech of Kritias.--Reply of Theramen?s.--Extreme violence of Kritias and the Thirty.--Condemnation of Theramen?s.--Death of Theramen?s--remarks on his character.--Increased tyranny of Kritias and the Thirty.--The Thirty forbid intellectual teaching.--Sokrat?s and the Thirty.--Growing insecurity of the Thirty.--Gradual alteration of feeling in Greece, since the capture of Athens.--Demand by the allies of Sparta to share in the spoils of the war--refused by Sparta.--Unparalleled ascendency of Lysander.--His overweening ambition--oppressive dominion of Sparta.--Disgust excited in Greece by the enormities of the Thirty.--Opposition to Lysander at Sparta--king Pausanias.--Kallikratidas compared with Lysander.--Sympathy at Thebes and elsewhere with the Athenian exiles.--Thrasybulus seizes Phyl?--repulses the Thirty in their attack.--Farther success of Thrasybulus--the Thirty retreat to Athens.--Discord among the oligarchy at Athens--seizure of the Eleusinians.--Thrasybulus establishes himself in Peiraeus.--The Thirty attack him and are defeated--Kritias is slain.--Colloquy during the burial-truce--language of Kleokritus.--Discouragement of the oligarchs at Athens--deposition of the Thirty and appointment of the Ten--the Thirty go to Eleusis.--The Ten carry on the war against the exiles.--Increasing strength of Thrasybulus.--Arrival of Lysander in Attica with a Spartan force.--Straightened condition of the exiles in Peiraeus.--Spartan king Pausanias conducts an expedition into Attica; opposed to Lysander.--His dispositions unfavorable to the oligarchy; reaction against the Thirty.--Pausanias attacks Peiraeus; his partial success.--Peace party in Athens--sustained by Pausanias.--Pacification granted by Pausanias and the Spartan authorities.--The Spartans evacuate Attica--Thrasybulus and the exiles are restored--harangue of Thrasybulus.--Restoration of the democracy.--Capture of Eleusis--entire reunion of Attica--flight of the survivors of the Thirty. 210-290

FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY TO THE DEATH OF ALKIBIADES.

Miserable condition of Athens during the two preceding years.--Immediate relief caused by the restoration.--Unanimous sentiment towards the renewed democracy.--Amnesty--treatment of the Thirty and the Ten.--Disfranchising proposition of Phormisius.--The proposition rejected--speech composed by Lysias against it.--Revision of the laws--the Nomothetae.--Decree, that no criminal inquiries should be carried back beyond the archonship of Eukleid?s, B.C. 403.--Oath taken by the senate and the dikasts modified.--Farther precautions to insure the observance of the amnesty.--Absence of harsh reactionary feeling, both after the Thirty and after the Four Hundred.--Generous and reasonable behavior of the demos--contrasted with that of the oligarchy.--Care of the people to preserve the rights of private property.--Repayment to the Lacedaemonians.--The horsemen, or knights.--Revision of the laws--Nikomachus.--Adoption of the fuller Ionic alphabet, in place of the old Attic, for writing up the laws.--Memorable epoch of the archonship of Eukleid?s. The rhetor Lysias.--Other changes at Athens--abolition of the Board of Hellenotamiae--restriction of the right of citizenship.--Honorary reward to Thrasybulus and the exiles.--Position and views of Alkibiad?s in Asia.--Artaxerxes Mn?mon, the new king of Persia. Plans of Cyrus--Alkibiad?s wishes to reveal them at Susa.--The Lacedaemonians conjointly with Cyrus require Pharnabazus to put him to death.--Assassination of Alkibiad?s by order of Pharnabazus.--Character of Alkibiad?s. 290-316

THE DRAMA.--RHETORIC AND DIALECTICS.--THE SOPHISTS.

Athens immediately after Eukleid?s--political history little known.--Extraordinary development of dramatic genius.--Gradual enlargement of tragedy.--Abundance of new tragedy at Athens.--Accessibility of the theatre to the poorest citizens.--The?rikon, or festival-pay.--Effect of the tragedies on the public mind of Athens.--AEschylus, Sophokl?s, and Euripid?s--modifications of tragedy.--Popularity arising from expenditure of money on the festivals.--Growth and development of comedy at Athens.--Comic poets before Aristophan?s--Kratinus, etc.--Exposure of citizens by name in comedy--forbidden for a time--then renewed--Krat?s and the milder comedy.--Aristophan?s.--Comedy in its effect on the Athenian mind.--Mistaken estimate of the comic writers, as good witnesses or just critics.--Aversion of Solon to the drama when nascent.--Dramatic poetry as compared with the former kinds of poetry.--Ethical sentiment, interest, and debate, infused into the drama.--The drama formed the stage of transition to rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical philosophy.--Practical value and necessity of rhetorical accomplishments.--Rhetoric and dialectics.--Empedokl?s of Agrigentum--first name in the rhetorical movement.--Zeno of Elea--first name in the dialectical movement.--Eleatic school--Parmenid?s.--Zeno and Melissus--their dialectic attacks upon the opponents of Parmenid?s.--Zeno at Athens--his conversation both with Perikl?s and with Sokrat?s.--Early manifestation, and powerful efficacy, of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy.--Rhetoric and dialectics--men of active life and men of speculation--two separate lines of intellectual activity.--Standing antithesis between these two intellectual classes--vein of ignorance at Athens, hostile to both.--Gradual enlargement of the field of education at Athens--increased knowledge and capacity of the musical teachers.--The sophists--true Greek meaning of that word--invidious sentiment implied in it.--The name sophist applied by Plato in a peculiar sense, in his polemics against the eminent paid teachers.--Misconceptions arising from Plato's peculiar use of the word sophist.--Paid teachers or sophists of the Sokratic age--Protagoras, Gorgias, etc.--Plato and the sophists--two different points of view--the reformer and theorist against the practical teacher.--The sophists were professional teachers for active life, like Isokrat?s and Quintilian.--Misinterpretations of the dialogues of Plato as carrying evidence against the sophists.--The sophists as paid teachers--no proof that they were greedy or exorbitant--proceeding of Protagoras.--The sophists as rhetorical teachers--groundless accusations against them in that capacity, made also against Sokrat?s, Isokrat?s, and others.--Thrasymachus--his rhetorical precepts.--Prodikus--his discrimination of words analogous in meaning.--Protagoras--his treatise on Truth--his opinions about the pagan gods.--His view of the cognitive process and its relative nature.--Gorgias--his treatise on physical subjects--misrepresentations of the scope of it.--Unfounded accusations against the sophists.--They were not a sect or school, with common doctrines or method; they were a profession, with strong individual peculiarities.--The Athenian character was not really corrupted, between 480 B.C. and 405 B.C.--Prodikus--The choice of Hercules.--Protagoras--real estimate exhibited of him by Plato.--Hippias of Elis--how he is represented by Plato.--Gorgias, P?lus, and Kallikl?s.--Doctrine advanced by P?lus.--Doctrine advanced by Kallikl?s--anti-social.--Kallikl?s is not a sophist.--The doctrine put into his mouth could never have been laid down in any public lecture among the Athenians.--Doctrine of Thrasymachus in the "Republic" of Plato.--Such doctrine not common to all the sophists--what is offensive in it is, the manner in which it is put forward.--Opinion of Thrasymachus afterwards brought out by Glaukon--with less brutality, and much greater force of reason.--Plato against the sophists generally. His category of accusation comprehends all society, with all the poets and statesmen.--It is unjust to try either the sophists or the statesmen of Athens, by the standard of Plato.--Plato distinctly denies that Athenian corruption was to be imputed to the sophists.--The sophists were not teachers of mere words, apart from action.--General good effect of their teaching upon the youth.--Great reputation of the sophists--evidence of respect for intellect and of a good state of public sentiment. 317-399

SOKRATES.

Different spirit shown towards Sokrat?s and towards the sophists.--Birth and family of Sokrat?s.--His physical and moral qualities.--Xenophon and Plato as witnesses.--Their pictures of Sokrat?s are in the main accordant.--Habits of Sokrat?s.--Leading peculiarities of Sokrat?s.--His constant publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation.--Reason why Sokrat?s was shown up by Aristophan?s on the stage.--His persuasion of a special religious mission.--His daemon, or genius--other inspirations.--Oracle from Delphi declaring that no man was wiser than he.--His mission to test the false conceit of wisdom in others.--Confluence of the religious motive with the inquisitive and intellectual impulse in his mind--numerous enemies whom he made.--Sokrat?s a religious missionary, doing the work of philosophy.--Intellectual peculiarities of Sokrat?s.--He opened ethics as a new subject of scientific discussion.--Circumstances which turned the mind of Sokrat?s towards ethical speculations.--Limits of scientific study as laid down by Sokrat?s.--He confines study to human affairs, as distinguished from divine--to man and society.--Importance of the innovation--multitude of new and accessible phenomena brought under discussion.--Innovations of Sokrat?s as to method--dialectic method--inductive discourses--definitions.--Commencement of analytical consciousness of the mental operations--genera and species.--Sokrat?s compared with previous philosophers.--Great step made by Sokrat?s in laying the foundation of formal logic, afterwards expanded by Plato, and systematized by Aristotle.--Dialectical process employed by Sokrat?s--essential connection between method and subject.--Essential connection also between the dialectic process and the logical distribution of subject-matter--one in many and many in one.--Persuasion of religious mission in Sokrat?s, prompting him to extend his colloquial cross-examination to noted men.--His cross-examining purpose was not confined to noted men, but of universal application.--Leading ideas which directed the scrutiny of Sokrat?s--contrast between the special professions and the general duties of social life.--Platonic dialogues--discussion whether virtue is teachable.--Conceit of knowledge without real knowledge--universal prevalence of it.--Such confident persuasion, without science, belonged at that time to astronomy and physics, as well as to the subjects of man and society--it is now confined to the latter.--Sokrat?s first lays down the idea of ethical science, comprising the appropriate ethical end with theory and precepts.--Earnestness with which Sokrat?s inculcated self-examination--effect of his conversation upon others.--Preceptorial and positive exhortation of Sokrat?s chiefly brought out by Xenophon.--This was not the peculiarity of Sokrat?s--his powerful method of stirring up the analytical faculties.--Negative and indirect scrutiny of Sokrat?s produced strong thirst, and active efforts, for the attainment of positive truth.--Inductive process of scrutiny, and Baconian spirit, of Sokrat?s.--Sokratic method tends to create minds capable of forming conclusions for themselves--not to plant conclusions ready-made.--Grecian dialectics--their many-sided handling of subjects--force of the negative arm.--The subjects to which they were applied--man and society--essentially required such handling--reason why.--Real distinction and variance between Sokrat?s and the sophists.--Prodigious efficacy of Sokrat?s in forming new philosophical minds.--General theory of Sokrat?s on ethics--he resolved virtue into knowledge, or wisdom.--This doctrine defective as stating a part for the whole.--He was led to this general doctrine by the analogy of special professions.--Constant reference of Sokrat?s to duties of practice and detail.--The derivative reasonings of Sokrat?s were of larger range than his general doctrine.--Political opinions of Sokrat?s.--Long period during which Sokrat?s exercised his vocation as a public converser.--Accusation against him by Mel?tus, Anytus, and Lykon.--The real ground for surprise is, that that accusation had not been preferred before.--Inevitable unpopularity incurred by Sokrat?s in his mission.--It was only from the general toleration of the Athenian democracy and population, that he was allowed to go on so long.--Particular circumstances which brought on the trial of Sokrat?s.--Private offence of Anytus.--Unpopularity arising to Sokrat?s from his connection with Kritias and Alkibiad?s.--Enmity of the poets and rhetors to Sokrat?s.--Indictment--grounds of the accusers--effects of the "Clouds" of Aristophan?s, in creating prejudice against Sokrat?s.--Accusation of corruption in teaching was partly founded on political grounds.--Perversion of the poets alleged against him.--Remarks of Xenophon upon these accusations.--The charges touch upon the defective point of the Sokratic ethical theory.--His political strictures.--The verdict against Sokrat?s was brought upon him partly by his own concurrence.--Small majority by which he was condemned.--Sokrat?s defended himself like one who did not care to be acquitted.--The "Platonic Apology."--Sentiment of Sokrat?s about death.--Effect of his defence upon the dikasts.--Assertion of Xenophon that Sokrat?s might have been acquitted if he had chosen it.--The sentence--how passed in Athenian procedure.--Sokrat?s is called upon to propose some counter-penalty against himself--his behavior.--Aggravation of feeling in the dikasts against him in consequence of his behavior.--Sentence of death--resolute adherence of Sokrat?s to his own convictions.--Satisfaction of Sokrat?s with the sentence, on deliberate conviction.--Sokrat?s in prison for thirty days--he refuses to accept the means of escape--his serene death.--Originality of Sokrat?s.--Views taken of Sokrat?s as a moral preacher and as a skeptic--the first inadequate, the second incorrect.--Sokrat?s, positive and practical in his end; negative only in his means.--Two points on which Sokrat?s is systematically negative.--Method of Sokrat?s of universal application.--Condemnation of Sokrat?s one of the misdeeds of intolerance.--Extenuating circumstances--principle of orthodox enforcement recognized generally in ancient times.--Number of personal enemies made by Sokrat?s.--His condemnation brought on by himself.--The Athenians did not repent it. 399-496

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.--OLIGARCHY OF FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

About a year elapsed between the catastrophe of the Athenians near Syracuse and the victory which they gained over the Mil?sians, on landing near Mil?tus . After the first of those two events, the complete ruin of Athens had appeared both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic had been her rally, that, at the time of the second, she was found again carrying on a tolerable struggle, though with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system, against enemies both bolder and more numerous than ever. Nor is there any reason to doubt that her foreign affairs might have gone on thus improving, had they not been endangered at this critical moment by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens, bringing her again to the brink of ruin, from which she was only rescued by the incompetence of her enemies.

That treason took its first rise from the exile Alkibiad?s. I have already recounted how this man, alike unprincipled and energetic, had thrown himself with his characteristic ardor into the service of Sparta, and had indicated to her the best means of aiding Syracuse, of inflicting positive injury upon Athens, and lastly, of provoking revolt among the Ionic allies of the latter. It was by his boldness and personal connections in Ionia that the revolt of Chios and Mil?tus had been determined.

In the course of a few months, however, he had greatly lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished so easily and rapidly as he had predicted; Chalkideus, the Spartan commander with whom he had acted was defeated and slain near Mil?tus; the ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other ephors, just about the end of September, or beginning of October, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Mil?tus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; while his personal enemy king Agis still remained to persecute him. Moreover, there was in the character of this remarkable man something so essentially selfish, vain, and treacherous, that no one could ever rely upon his faithful co?peration. And as soon as any reverse occurred, that very energy and ability, which seldom failed him, made those with whom he acted the more ready to explain the mischance, by supposing that he had betrayed them.

See Thucyd. v, 36.

It was thus that, after the defeat of Mil?tus, king Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiad?s as a traitor to Sparta; upon which the new ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death. Alkibiad?s had now an opportunity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent, with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him, yet the utmost which they could obtain was that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination, and without any idea of judicial trial, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Thucyd. viii, 45. ??? ??? ????? ?????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ?? ???????????? ???? ?????????? , etc.

Alkibiad?s, however, got intimation of the order in time to retire to Tissaphern?s. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Mil?sians, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiad?s soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphern?s himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King, Alkibiad?s urged, to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other: he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid of the Lacedaemonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both: first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves; which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.

Thucyd. viii, 45, 46.

Thus far Alkibiad?s gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedaemonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphern?s from Lacedaemon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedaemonian or Athenian, it would nevertheless be found easier to arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens than with those of Lacedaemon. The former, he argued, neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King; while the latter, forswearing all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic Greeks of the same privilege. This view appeared to be countenanced by the objection which Theramen?s and many of the Peloponnesian officers had taken to the first convention concluded by Chalkideus and Alkibiad?s with Tissaphern?s: objections afterwards renewed by Lichas even against the second modified convention of Theramen?s, and accompanied with an indignant protest against the idea of surrendering to the Great King all the territory which had been ever possessed by his predecessors.

Thucyd. viii, 46-52.

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiad?s professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were either futile or founded on false assumptions. For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphern?s at all lend himself to any such positive impression; though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiad?s, that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without insuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success: or rather, this duplicity was so congenial to his Oriental mind, that there was no need of Alkibiad?s to recommend it. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money. Established along with Tissaphern?s at Magnesia,--the same place which had been occupied about fifty years before by another Athenian exile, equally unprincipled, and yet abler, Themistokl?s,--Alkibiad?s served as interpreter of his views in all his conversations with the Greeks, and appeared to be thoroughly in his confidence: an appearance of which he took advantage to pass himself off falsely upon the Athenians at Samos, as having the power of turning Persian wealth to the aid of Athens.

The first payment made by Tissaphern?s, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorg?s, to the Peloponnesians at Mil?tus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half, and for this reduction Alkibiad?s undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians, he urged, gave no more than half a drachma; not because they could not afford more, but because, from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would induce them to return when called for. As he probably never expected that such subterfuges, employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head, would carry conviction to any one, so he induced Tissaphern?s to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs: a mode of argument which was found effectual in silencing the complaints of all, with the single exception of the Syracusan Hermokrat?s. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiad?s spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens, he said, and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burdens in their own defence. Nor was it anything less, he added, than sheer impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Greece, if they required a foreign military force for their protection, to require at the same time that others should furnish the means of paying it. At the same time, however, he intimated,--by way of keeping up hopes for the future,--that Tissaphern?s was at present carrying on the war at his own cost; but if hereafter remittances should arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed, with the addition of aid to the Grecian cities in any other way which could be reasonably asked. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phenician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless: an assurance not merely deceitful but mischievous, since it was employed to dissuade them from all immediate action, and to paralyze their navy during its moments of fullest vigor and efficiency. Even the reduced rate of pay was furnished so irregularly, and the Peloponnesian force kept so starved, that the duplicity of the satrap became obvious to every one, and was only carried through by his bribery to the officers.

Thucyd. viii, 45. ?? ?? ??? ???? ???????????, ??? ??????????? ?? ???????? ??? ??????????????? ??????.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation. Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that it is right.

Thucyd. viii, 45. ??? ?? ?????? ???????? ???????? ????????, ????? ????????? ???? ??? ????????????, ?? ?? ??? ???? ??????????? ????, ???????????? ????? ??? ???????, ????????? ?? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ??? ??????? ?????????? ???????????.

Thucyd. viii, 46. ??? ?? ?????? ????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ????????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??? ????????? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ?? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ???????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ???????? ????? ????????, ????????? ??? ???? ???????, ?? ?? ????, ?????????????? ? ???? ?????????, ?? ???????? ???????????.

While Alkibiad?s, as the confidential agent and interpreter of Tissaphern?s, was carrying on this anti-Peloponnesian policy through the autumn and winter of 412-411 B.C.,--partly during the stay of the Peloponnesian fleet at Mil?tus, partly after it had moved to Knidus and Rhodes,--he was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Peloponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphern?s, were facts well known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was, to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendency over the mind of the satrap. His hostility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplishing his return, unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution; which, moreover, was not less gratifying to his sentiment of vengeance for the past, than to his ambition for the future. Accordingly, he sent over a private message to the officers and trierarchs at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to be remembered to the "best men" in the armament, such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other; and intimating his anxious wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphern?s as their ally. But he would do this only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government; nor would he ever again set foot amidst the odious democracy to whom he owed his banishment.

Thucyd. viii, 47. ?? ??? ??? ?????????? ????????????? ?????? ?? ???? ???????????? ????? ??????, ???? ????????? ???? ????? ?? ~???? ??????????~ ??? ????????, ??? ??? ????????? ????????, ??? ?? ??????? ???? ?????????? ?? ?????? ?????????, ????????, etc.

Thucyd. viii, 47.

Such was the first originating germ of that temporary calamity, which so nearly brought Athens to absolute ruin, called the Oligarchy of Four Hundred: a suggestion from the same exile who had already so deeply wounded his country by sending Gylippus to Syracuse, and the Lacedaemonian garrison to Dekeleia. As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. To subvert the democracy for their own profit, and to be rewarded for doing so with the treasures of Persia as a means of carrying on the war against the Peloponnesians, was an extent of good fortune greater than they could possibly have hoped. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors, upon whom the cost of military operations fell: from which burden they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. Elate with so tempting a promise, a deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiad?s, who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphern?s, but the Great King himself, into active alliance and co?peration with Athens, provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust. He doubtless did not omit to set forth the other side of the alternative; that, if the proposition were refused, Persian aid would be thrown heartily into the scale of the Peloponnesians, in which case, there was no longer any hope of safety for Athens.

Thucyd. viii, 48.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical men in Samos came together, both in greater number and with redoubled ardor, to take their measures for subverting the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion, but who were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them on condition, and only on condition, that they would relinquish their democracy. Such was at this time the indispensable need of foreign money for the purposes of the war, such was the certainty of ruin, if the Persian treasure went to the aid of the enemy, that the most democratical Athenian might well hesitate when the alternative was thus laid before him. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that they had the feeling of the armament altogether against them, that the best which they could expect from it was a reluctant acquiescence, and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands and management. They formed themselves into a political confederacy, or hetaeria, for the purpose of discussing the best measures towards their end. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander at the head, to make known the new prospects, and to put the standing oligarchical clubs, or hetaeries, into active co?peration for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy, and farther to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance, when once she should be relieved from her democracy, and placed under the rule of her "best and most virtuous citizens."

It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias that Phrynichus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance this assertion, and the narrative of Thucydid?s gives quite a different color to their behavior.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover, his forwardness and energy--presently to be described--in taking the formidable initiative of putting down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient evidence that the taunts of the comic writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the Symposion repeats this taunt which also appears in Aristophan?s, Eupolis, Plato Comicus, and others: see the passages collected in Meineke, Histor. Critic. Comicor. Graecorum, vol. i, p. 178, etc.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person libelled.

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been, subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiad?s, on one hand, against hearty co?peration, and a free supply of gold from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realized, or that when the first part should have been brought to pass, the second would follow? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiad?s,--very little to be trusted, even when promising what was in his own power to perform, as we may recollect from his memorable dealing with the Lacedaemonian envoys at Athens,--and on the present occasion, vouching for something in itself extravagant and preposterous. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiad?s, or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiad?s coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves; and the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone towards this goal, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into a sincere persuasion. Without adverting to this fact, we should be at a loss to understand how the word of such a man as Alkibiad?s, on such a matter, could be so implicitly accepted as to set in motion a whole train of novel and momentous events.

There was one man, and one man alone, so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynichus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Mil?tus; a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiad?s, and thoroughly seeing through his character and projects. Though Phrynichus was afterwards one of the chief organizers of the oligarchical movement, when it became detached from, and hostile to Alkibiad?s, yet under the actual circumstances he discountenanced it altogether. Alkibiad?s, he said, had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp, the greatest misfortune that could at present happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence, while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover, the dependencies of Athens--upon whom it was now proposed to confer simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government--would receive that boon with indifference. Those who had already revolted would not come back, those who yet remained faithful, would not be the more inclined to remain so longer. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. Assuredly, they would not expect better treatment from an oligarchical government at Athens, than from a democratical; for they knew that those self-styled "good and virtuous" men, who would form the oligarchy, were, as ministers of democracy, the chief advisers and instigators of the people to iniquitous deeds, most commonly for nothing but their own individual profit. From an Athenian oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under the democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal, while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement, from the people and the popular dikasteries. Such, Phrynichus affirmed on his own personal knowledge, was the genuine feeling among the dependencies of Athens. Having thus shown the calculations of the conspirators--as to Alkibiad?s, as to Persia, and as to the allied dependencies--to be all illusory, Phrynichus concluded by entering his decided protest against adopting the propositions of Alkibiad?s.

Thucyd. viii, 48. ??? ?? ?????????? ??????, ??? ?????????? ?? ???? ??????????, ??? ?? ??? ????? ?? ???????????????, ?? ??????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ??????????? ??????????????, ???? ?? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ?? ??? ??????????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ? ??????????? ????????? ??????, ? ???? ???????? ?? ?????? ?????? ?????????? ?????. ???? ~?? ?????? ???????? ?????????????~ ??? ?????? ?????? ???????? ????? ???????? ???????? ??? ~?????, ???????? ????? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ?? ????, ?? ?? ?? ????? ?????? ??????????~? ??? ?? ??? ??? ???????? ?????, ??? ??????? ?? ??? ?????????? ???????????, ??? ?? ~????? ???? ?? ????????? ????? ??? ??????? ???????????~. ??? ????? ~???? ????? ??? ????? ???????????~ ??? ?????? ????? ????? ???????, ??? ???? ?????????.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

But in this protest, borne out afterwards by the result, he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical conspirators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiad?s; and at the same time to propose to the people their new intended ally, Tissaphern?s.

Phrynichus knew well what would be the consequence to himself--if this consummation were brought about, as he foresaw that it probably would be--from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiad?s against his recent opposition. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took measures for destroying Alkibiad?s beforehand, even by a treasonable communication to the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus at Mil?tus, to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynichus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphern?s and Alkibiad?s. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedaemonians, but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphern?s, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynichus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiad?s forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos, of the step taken by Phrynichus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynichus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, complaining of the violation of confidence in regard to the former, but at the same time intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedaemonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to come and attack the place, which was as yet unfortified, explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted. And he concluded by saying that this, as well as every other means of defence, must be pardoned to one whose life was in danger from a personal enemy. Foreseeing that Astyochus would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynichus waited a proper time, and then revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. He insisted on the necessity of immediate precautions, and himself, as general, superintended the work of fortification, which was soon completed. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiad?s, communicating to the army that Phrynichus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by order of Phrynichus himself had been already completed, was construed as a mere trick on the part of Alkibiad?s himself, through his acquaintance with the intentions of the Peloponnesians, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made by his second letter effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynichus by the first, insomuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.

Thucyd. viii, 50, 51.

But Phrynichus, though successful in extricating himself, failed thoroughly in his manoeuvre against the influence and life of Alkibiad?s; in whose favor the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects which had been conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiad?s and renounce their democratical constitution; in return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians. Violent was the storm which these propositions raised in the public assembly. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy; few, if any, distinctly against it. The opponents of Alkibiad?s indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him, in violation of the laws, and in reversal of a judicial sentence, while the Eumolpidae and Kerykes, the sacred families connected with the Eleusinian mysteries which Alkibiad?s had violated, entered their solemn protest on religious grounds to the same effect. Against all these vehement opponents, whose impassioned invectives obtained the full sympathy of the assembly, Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively by name, and put to each the question: "What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities, and when the king as well as Tissaphern?s are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side?" The answer was a melancholy negative, or perhaps not less melancholy silence. "Well, then, rejoined Peisander, that object cannot possibly be attained, unless we conduct our political affairs for the future in a more moderate way, and put the powers of government more in the hands of a few, and unless we recall Alkibiad?s, the only man now living who is competent to do the business. Under present circumstances, we surely shall not lay greater stress upon our political constitution than upon the salvation of the city; the rather as what we now enact may be hereafter modified, if it be found not to answer."

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