Read Ebook: A General's Letters to His Son on Minor Tactics by Anonymous

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The "crucifix" strong point is also a good pattern, but I think that the one that I have given you is better, as it is in every way a less satisfactory mark for the enemy artillery, and also gives you quite as good, if not better, opportunity of using all your rifles in every direction.

My next letter will contain a problem for a rearguard commander.

LETTER V

MY DEAR DICK,--

The last scheme I gave you dealt with the taking up of a position when an attack by a weak force was probable within an hour or so of your occupying it, and also with the strengthening of the same position for an expected attack by a stronger force twelve hours later. This one deals with a rearguard action. It is straightforward and plain. The object that troops fighting a rearguard action should have in mind is to keep the enemy at arm's length, to punish him severely if he is too bold, and at the same time not to compromise their own retreat, unless duty requires them to sacrifice themselves in order to save the main body. I will now set you the problem before I make my own solution too evident by my remarks. It is my intention to add a few more words at the end of this letter, but I do not wish you to look at them until you have written your own solution.

PROBLEM 4

The banks of the River Lea are steep, the river is about four feet six inches deep, except near the ford. The bottom is muddy. At the ford it is forty yards broad, in most other places about twenty yards. The fields on either side are firm. The roads shown on the sketch are dry and dusty. The soil is chalky. The depth of the river at the ford is two feet six inches. The date is June 20.

One of the orderlies attached to you reports that at Slag Farm there is a large quantity of wire, some of it barbed.

The brigade to which you belong is retiring in a southerly direction. The baggage moved in front of the brigade. The time is 5.30 p.m. You with your company, to which six mounted orderlies have been attached, are near Home Farm, the remainder of your battalion, which is in rear of the brigade, is passing through Silverton, when the adjutant rides up to you and gives you the following order:

"Information has been received that a hostile cavalry brigade is pursuing. You will take such steps as you may consider necessary to prevent the enemy crossing the River Lea between Stone Bridge and Slag Farm, both inclusive, until 7 p.m., at which hour you will be relieved by cavalry. You will be careful not to compromise your own retreat. Having accomplished your task, you will rejoin your unit."

How do you appreciate the situation, and what steps will you take to carry out your instructions?

The River Lea is in all places within 800 yards of the ridge, and as the conditions are particularly favourable for fire action from the ridge, there is no necessity for you to place your men down the forward slope. The circumstances which render the situation so favourable for fire action are that it is practically impossible for the enemy's cavalry to cross the River Lea, except at the bridge or at the ford. The bridge and the road, with ponds on either side of it, just to the north of the bridge, form a defile 150 yards long, through which the enemy must pass. The ponds and the river also afford you an excellent opportunity to check the range by the splash of your bullets.

It has been reported that a large quantity of wire, some of it barbed, is to be found at Slag Farm. Lieutenant Smith will take steps to obstruct the ford with this with the object of denying its use to the enemy.

The officer commanding No. 1 Platoon will range on the ponds near the bridge and on the road junction to the north of them, and will similarly pass the range chart to the officer commanding No. 2 Platoon. This ranging will be carried out at once in order that the ranging by Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons may be finished before the ranging is commenced by the officers commanding Nos. 3 and 4 Platoons, which will be carried out under the orders of Lieutenant Smith.

N.B.--I am quite aware that a company is supposed to carry a Barr & Stroud range-finder. Although this is an excellent instrument when it is in thorough order, there is really no such reliable range-finder as a rifle fired at a mark which will show the impact of the bullet.

In the proper solution of the foregoing scheme, everything really depends upon your fire orders. I am presuming that your men are fairly well trained with the rifle. I wish, of course, that all our men were trained up to the standard of the Old Contemptibles, but "Rome was not built in a day," nor can discipline and good marksmanship become part of a man's second nature as a result of only a few months' training. If, however, your men are reasonably good shots and can fire at least fifteen rounds a minute , in such cases as the above much more will depend upon whether you give correct fire orders than upon whether the men are first-class marksmen or only moderately good shots. You can compare a company of first-class marksmen to a Choke-bore gun which shoots farther and harder but requires a skilled game shot to use with advantage, whereas a company of moderately-trained shots would resemble an ordinary scatter gun, with which the ordinary shot would probably do more execution. If you give a range as 1,200 yards when it is only 1,000 yards and you have marksmen, no shots will fall on the object; whereas if your company were composed of third-class shots, the chances are that it would be well sprinkled with bullets. Do not think from this that I prefer the third-class shots, for that is very decidedly not the case; but if you have a highly finished weapon, you want a good man behind it, although in the hands of such a one it will do brilliant execution. If you have a company of good shots and are not certain of a range, your best plan is to fire with combined sights and thus to increase the depth of the fire-swept ground. This method, although in many cases the best to adopt, is bound to diminish the efficacy of your fire, for if the correct range be 1,200 yards and you fire one platoon at 1,000 yards, one at 1,100, one at 1,200, and one at 1,300, it stands to reason that you can only hope to get a quarter as many hits as you would do if you gave the whole four platoons the correct range; but even that is better than giving the range at 1,000 and missing the mark altogether. It is a bad plan to go "Nap" before you have looked at your hand. I shall later on give you certain little problems for solution in which I am of opinion that combined sights should be used. In the problem under consideration, however, their use would be absolutely wrong. You can check all the ranges by seeing the splash of the bullets either in the ponds, in the river, or on the Chalk Pit, and you should be content with nothing except the correct range. Young officers are always apt to consider that so long as they have taught their company to shoot fairly well, they have done their duty with regard to musketry. This is, in reality, by no means the case. The company is simply the sportsman's gun; the commander has to learn how to use it.

There are many circumstances under which a man has to pick out his own target, as, for instance, when the enemy is attacking, and here everything depends upon his individual marksmanship. There are, however, many other occasions in which if 10 per cent. of the effect depends upon whether the men are first-class marksmen or only ordinary decent shots, 90 per cent. will depend upon whether the officer gives fire orders properly adapted to the situation. The above problem is an illustration of this principle.

You should notice that in my solution I carefully arranged that the party comprised of Nos. 2 and 3 Platoons should not commence ranging until Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons had finished. Were they to fire simultaneously, confusion in the splashes made by the bullets would be the result.

Don't forget to hand over your range card to your relief.

LETTER VI

MY DEAR DICK,--

I will set you another problem.

What action will you take?

There seems to be every chance of your being able to ambuscade this party, and you should let it advance until the groups which the main body has in front of it are within fifty yards of your picquet. You should tell off a few men on the flanks to deal with these groups, and turn the fire of the whole of the rest of your platoon on to the main body. You must be careful to see that all your men lie down, that no one but yourself has his head above ground level, and you must camouflage yourself. The suspense in such a situation as this makes great demands on the men's discipline, and they are apt to look up and be seen by the enemy, thus destroying all hope of surprise.

What action would you take?

What action would you take?

In this case the situation is changed. You are an outpost, and your first duty is to warn your main body in case of an attack and to give it time to prepare itself. It is just possible that if you allow the battalion to approach to within 300 yards you might deal it such a blow as to almost destroy it; but if, on the contrary, the covering groups were composed of really good soldiers and the companies were well commanded, there would be a great chance of your being rushed, and this is a risk which you ought not to take, for it would compromise the whole situation. In these circumstances you should therefore take steps to open a rapid fire on the enemy immediately with your men and your Lewis gun. Your object in doing this would be to keep him at arm's length and delay his advance as much as possible so as to give your supports and reserves time to prepare themselves.

PROBLEM 6

MY DEAR DICK,--

In this letter I am going to set you another fire problem. It is one in which, presuming that the men are fairly well trained in musketry, everything depends on the orders given by the company commander.

State how the situation presents itself to you and also give your exact orders.

You should reason with yourself as follows:

"If I advance beyond the hedge I shall be seen and my company will be opposed by a battalion. There seems to be an excellent opportunity of surprising the enemy, who shows no sign of moving, with my concentrated fire, and I shall consequently make my plans deliberately. From my map I judge the distance from the top of the ridge to the bridge over the River Spate to be 1,300 yards, and the centre of the battalion about 1,400 yards, but as I want to be quite sure of getting the battalion into my bracket, I shall use combined sights. I shall first line up the whole company 30 yards behind the hedge, and then order No. 1 Platoon to fix their sights at 1,300, No. 2 at 1,400, No. 3 at 1,500, and No. 4 at 1,600 yards, with the Lewis gun of No. 1 Platoon at 1,350, that of No. 2 at 1,400, that of No. 3 at 1,450, and that of No. 4 at 1,500 yards. I shall then order the whole company to creep up into position, and when the target has been properly pointed out I shall blow my whistle, on which every man will fire twenty rounds rapid and each Lewis gun six drums. At the end of the twenty rounds I can, if necessary, correct my ranges. Men are, as a rule, more apt to fire high than low, and I should have given the ranges 1,200, 1,300, 1,400, 1,500, instead of 1,300, 1,400, 1,500, 1,600, had it not been that the river will prevent the enemy rushing straight towards me if he finds the fire is high, whereas if my ranges are short he could get out of range by retiring."

PROBLEM 7

MY DEAR DICK,--

The following is a problem in trench warfare such as you may be called upon to solve any day in the trenches.

The company of which you are in command has succeeded in getting into a trench a section of which is given in the diagram. It has only incurred about 10 per cent. of casualties. The trench is the last of the German system, and there is a clear field of fire for about 100 yards in the direction in which the enemy has retired; after that there is a thick wood.

What action will you take to prepare for the enemy's counter-attack?

See Problem 3, p. 35.

You must at once place look-out men to give you warning of any sign of the enemy assembling in the edge of the wood to your front and be prepared to open on them with rifle grenades.

The real advantage that a machine gun or Lewis gun has over a rifle is that from a small point of vantage one of these weapons can pour a tremendous hail of fire, and in such circumstances as those depicted above there is no doubt but that the first consideration should be to get your Lewis guns into position.

If possible, it is best to place these in pairs, shooting obliquely and crossing their fire in front of you. As soon as this is done you should thin out and organise your defence in depth. This being carried out, you must determine what localities you will hold and where you will have your gaps. You should generally have a locality in front of any communication trench leading up from the rear. As soon as you have determined on your localities, you must set-to and build a fire step. The next measure to take in order of importance is to collect ammunition and place it at convenient points. After you have done this, try to put wire or some other obstacle in front. In advising this, I am presuming that you have reached your final objective. Be careful to remove any old German wire behind you which will prevent your own supports coming up over the open to reinforce you. Try to get your localities marked by lamps at night, that your own friends in rear can see where they are.

PROBLEM 8

What steps will you take to carry out the instructions you have received?

A knife-rest is a portable wire entanglement about 10 feet long, made upon a wooden frame-work.

PROBLEM 9

MY DEAR DICK,--

This week my letter will be a short one, as it only contains one very simple problem.

Does any special way of taking prisoners alive in this road suggest itself to you?

The above little scheme is so simple that I should feel that I ought to apologise for setting it, were it not that I am quite certain that three out of four of your comrades to whom you may set it will not give the proper solution.

I saw a similar little problem given to men of different regiments in India. The only troops who answered it properly were Pathans. It apparently much resembles traps which they set for one another in their inter-tribal fights. Although some twenty teams competed, neither British troops, Sikhs, Hindustani, Mohammedans, nor Rajputs ever managed to successfully catch their men.

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