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Read Ebook: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 Volume 16 by Various
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Ebook has 7064 lines and 280342 words, and 142 pages
One Hundred and Fifty-second Day, Tuesday, 11 June 1946, Morning Session 1 Afternoon Session 32
One Hundred and Fifty-third Day, Wednesday, 12 June 1946, Morning Session 61 Afternoon Session 106
One Hundred and Fifty-fourth Day, Thursday, 13 June 1946, Morning Session 141 Afternoon Session 160
One Hundred and Fifty-fifth Day, Friday, 14 June 1946, Morning Session 204 Afternoon Session 239
One Hundred and Fifty-sixth Day, Monday, 17 June 1946, Morning Session 263 Afternoon Session 288
One Hundred and Fifty-seventh Day, Tuesday, 18 June 1946, Morning Session 312 Afternoon Session 338
One Hundred and Fifty-eighth Day, Wednesday, 19 June 1946, Morning Session 378 Afternoon Session 417
One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Day, Thursday, 20 June 1946, Morning Session 447 Afternoon Session 477
One Hundred and Sixtieth Day, Friday, 21 June 1946, Morning Session 513 Afternoon Session 551
One Hundred and Sixty-first Day, Saturday, 22 June 1946, Morning Session 592
One Hundred and Sixty-second Day, Monday, 24 June 1946, Morning Session 621 Afternoon Session 646
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND DAY Tuesday, 11 June 1946
MR. THOMAS J. DODD : Mr. President, I should like to clear up the matter that I raised yesterday with respect to the notes of the conference between this defendant and Hitler. I had the investigation made and I think these are the facts. Apparently, Colonel Williams of our staff, who interrogated this defendant late in October, was handed these notes by the defendant; and somehow or other they never did reach our files and have been misplaced. So the defendant was quite right in saying that he turned them over, but I think in error in saying that he turned them over to me.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER : Yesterday we had reached one of the most important points in the Indictment, the question of the evacuation of Jews from the Netherlands. Witness, what did you do when you learned of this removal of the Jews from the Netherlands? Did you write any letters?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART : Yesterday I stated that I had people sent from the Netherlands to the Auschwitz Camp in order to ascertain whether there were accommodations and, if so, what kind. I have given you the result of this inspection. I asked the Security Police, that is, Heydrich, whether it would not be possible for the evacuated Jews to keep up correspondence with the Netherlands. This concession was made. For about three-quarters of a year or a year correspondence was maintained; not only short post cards but long letters were permitted. I do not know how the camp administration did this; but the letters were identified as authentic by the addressee. When the number of letters dropped off later--it never stopped completely--the Security Police told me that the Jews in Auschwitz now had fewer acquaintances in the Netherlands, meaning other Jews, because most of them were already in Auschwitz.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, did you turn to Bormann, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that, after learning of Heydrich's order, I requested Bormann to inquire of the F?hrer whether Heydrich actually had such unlimited power. Bormann confirmed this. I admit frankly that I had misgivings about the evacuation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you do anything to alleviate these misgivings?
SEYSS-INQUART: My misgivings--which increased in the course of the war--were that the hardships of the war would be a heavy burden, above all for the Jews. If there were too little food in the Reich, the Jewish camps in particular would receive little, while probably the Jews would be treated severely and for comparatively slight reasons heavy punishment would be imposed upon them. Of course, I also thought of the unavoidable tearing apart of families, to a certain extent, at least, in the case of labor commitment. That also was the reason why we brought forward difficulties for 3 or 4 months.
The decisive argument, however, was the declaration of the competent authority, the Security Police, that in case of a landing attempt the Jews were not to be in the immediate theater of operations.
I ask the Court to consider that the most important and most decisive motive for me was always the fact that the German people were engaged in a life-and-death struggle. Today looking at it from another perspective the picture looks different. At that time, if we told ourselves that the Jews would be kept together in some camp, even if under severe conditions, and that after the end of the war they would find a settlement somewhere, the misgivings caused by this had to be cast aside in view of the consideration that their presence in the battle area might weaken the German power of resistance.
In the course of 1943 I spoke with Hitler and called his attention to this problem in the Netherlands. In his own convincing way he reassured me and at the same time admitted that he was thinking of a permanent evacuation of the Jews, if possible, from all of Europe with which Germany wanted to maintain friendly relations. He wanted to have the Jews settled on the eastern border of the German sphere of interest insofar as they were not able to emigrate to other parts of the earth.
At the beginning of 1944 I spoke with Himmler, whom I happened to meet in southern Bavaria. I asked him in a determined manner about the Jews in the Netherlands. The fact that our Eastern Front was being withdrawn meant that the camps would be in the battle area in the course of time, or at least in the rear area. I was afraid that the lot of the Jews would become even more serious then. Himmler said something to the following effect: "Do not worry; they are my best workers." I could not imagine that the Jews capable of labor were working while their relatives were being destroyed. I believed that in that case one could expect nothing else than that every Jew would attack a German and strangle him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you did learn of these evacuations? In your capacity as Reich Commissioner did you help carry out these evacuations through your administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the evacuation was a fact, I considered it proper to concern myself with it to the extent that was possible for me as Reich Commissioner. I gave my deputy in Amsterdam, Dr. Boehmke, power to carry out the evacuation, to exercise control, and to take steps if excesses occurred other than unavoidable difficulties, or to report such to me. Dr. Boehmke was in constant opposition to the so-called Central Office for Jewish Emigration. We had to intervene again and again, but I am convinced that we did not put an end to all hardships.
The Jews were collected in the Westerborg Camp. When the first transports left, I received a report that the trains were overcrowded. I vigorously remonstrated with the commander of the Security Police and asked him to see that the transport was carried out in an orderly manner. The Netherlands Report states that at the beginning the transports were made under tolerable conditions; later, conditions generally became worse. But that such excessive overcrowding of trains occurred as indicated in the report did not come to my knowledge. It is true that the Security Police made it very difficult to have the execution of these measures controlled. At the suggestion of some Dutch secretaries general, especially Van Damm and Froehlich, I effected an exception for a number of Jews. One could effect individual exceptions; the basic measures could not be changed. I believe that the number of exceptions is greater than indicated in the Netherlands Report, at least according to my reports.
These Jews were, in the final stage, in the Westerborg Camp. When the invasion began Himmler wanted to remove them. Upon my objections this was not done. But after the battle of Arnhem he removed them, as he said, to Theresienstadt; and I hope that they remained alive there.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you also release property on this occasion?
SEYSS-INQUART: These Jews who were made exceptions retained control of their property.
DR. STEINBAUER: In closing this chapter I should like once more to call the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1726-PS, USA-195, in the document book of the Prosecution. This document sums up the whole Jewish problem in the Netherlands, and on Page 6 it gives all the agencies which dealt with the Jewish problem. Under Number 3 you will find the General Commissioner for Security, the Higher SS and Police Leader H. Rauter, General of Police. Under Number 4 is the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, Leader Aus der Funte--under the "General Commissioner," as under 3. The report says about this:
"Apparently an organization for Jewish emigration; in reality, an organization to rob the Jews of their rights, to segregate them, or to deport them."
This was the most important office, which was directly under Himmler's Higher Police Leader, and not under the defendant.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to point out that Rauter functioned as Higher SS and Police Leader in this case, and not as "General Commissioner for Security," for the measures were carried out by the German Police, and not by the Netherlands police.
DR. STEINBAUER: The witness in a speech also spoke about his views on the Jewish problem at one time. The Prosecution has submitted a part of this speech.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Steinbauer, you are putting this Document 1726-PS to the witness, which contains a historical statement, apparently. Does the witness agree that the historical statement is accurate?
Do you, Defendant, agree that this historical statement is accurate?
SEYSS-INQUART: May I see the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Appendix 2.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Steinbauer, you put forward the document and it is for you to ascertain from the witness whether he agrees with the document or whether he challenges it.
SEYSS-INQUART: The presentation of facts is accurate, except for the addition of the correction which I made with reference to the "General Commissioner for Security."
THE PRESIDENT: There are certain passages in the document which your attention ought to be drawn to: February 1941, for instance. You have the document before you, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you look at the last entry under the heading February 1941? Do you see that?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You have to put that to the witness. He said that the facts are accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you will find under "February 1941" a statement--I have only the English here--saying that Jews were arrested and then sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
SEYSS-INQUART: I discussed this case yesterday. That was a measure at the direct order of Himmler, which only came to my knowledge after it had been carried out and against which I protested. To my knowledge, mass deportations to Mauthausen did not occur again after that.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what I understand the defendant to say is that that document is accurate except where you referred to under the Numbers 3 and 4, on the last page. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my testimony yesterday I confirmed the orders contained in this document, but not all the details of the actual events.
DR. STEINBAUER: The presentation on Page 6 of the individual agencies is correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: The actual presentation, too, is basically correct. Yesterday I spoke also of the burning of synagogues and of the prevention of the destruction of synagogues in The Hague and Amsterdam.
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