: Fighting Instructions 1530-1816 Publications of the Navy Records Society Vol. XXIX. by Corbett Julian Stafford - Great Britain History Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy Regulations; Great Britain. Royal Navy Communication systems; Naval tactics

@FreeBooks

Posted in: #FreeBooks #FreeBooksIndia #FreeBooksApp #gg

Vote Up Vote Down   0 Reactions

Login to give Reaction!

made, and it was followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which Howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet neglected to follow either his signal or his example.

In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circumstances were not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the flagship's log, was 'The admiral intends to pass through the enemy's line.' There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be distinguished by a pennant over.

What followed however was that the fleet passed between the two separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains of those days believed in--viz. to take suitable stations for mutual support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that for breaking the line which made the action general.

In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British officers at this time was something very different from that which Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of state, has the following passage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support, and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such manoeuvres.... Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn from them.'

This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for initiative in fighting him.

FOOTNOTES:

A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from 1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804. Two other copies are in the United Service Institution.

Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for 'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at Trafalgar.

In one of the United Service Institution copies the signal has been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing pennants have been written in.

Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time after 1798. For his original signal he substituted two in MS. with the following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.' Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant.

This last mediaeval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It is not found in Hoste.

In the United Service Institution.

Free books android app tbrJar TBR JAR Read Free books online gutenberg

(0)

Login to post a comment!